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PATIENTS' RIGHTS
DISCLOSURE, CONSENT AND CAPACITY
NIKKI HEIDEPRIEM
JUDITH RESNIK
THE recent Supreme Court decision invalidating state abortion stat-, utes,! the much-publicized Michigan psychosurgery decision,:! the
growing number of right to treatment cases,3 and the issuance of federal
guidelines protecting minors and other legally incompetent participants
in federally funded sterilization programs4 have prompted a reconsidera-
tion of the personal rights of patients 'within the physician-patient-state
relationship. Recent malpractice cases reveal an innovative trend in tort
law expanding the physician's duty to disclose information to a patient
in order to obtain that patient's informed consent.1> This article 'will dis-
cuss several of the complex issues associated with the physician-patient
relationship: how courts define the physician's duty to disclose under the
present law, when informed consent is required; when an adult is deemed
incompetent by the state to give such consent, and 'w'hat special considera-
tions arise as incidents of minority.
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1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.s. 113 (1973), and Doc v. Bolton, 410 U.s. 179 (1973).
2. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 73·194M-AW (Mich.
Cir. Ct. July 10. 1973), noted at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063. Sec notes 105·54 infra and accom·
panying text.
3. See, e.g.• Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), appeal pending,
No. 72-2634 (5th Cir. 1972), as discussed in Civil Rights, 1972/73 Ann. Sun'cy Am. L.
339, 371-74.
4. See Dep't Health, Educ. & Welfare, "General Guidelines Limiting Federal
Financial Assistance for Sterilization of Minors and Other Legally Incompetent Indi-
viduals," News Release, July 19, 1973. Formal regulations were issued September 21,
1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 26460 (Sept. 21, 1973). See N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 46, coL 3.
Congress has also recently considered legislation to protect patients' rights. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1973, at 34, coL 1, and Sept. 27, 1973, at 13, col. 1. Sec also draft of "Protec-
tion of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures" 38 Fed. Reg. 31738 (NO\·. 16, 1973).
5. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), eert. denied, 409 U.s.
1064 (1972), analyzed in text accompanying notes 6-43 infra; Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110
R.I. --> 295 A.2d 676 (1972), analyzed in te.xt accompanying notes 44-60 infra; and
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 CaL Rptr. 505 (1972), anal)'ZCd in text
accompanying notes 61-73 infra. See generally Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed
Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 548 (1973), for a cursory break-
down of the classic elements of this kind of tort action. Id. at 549. For an earlier
discussion of this topic, see Torts, 1966 Ann. Survey Am. L. 209, 231-33.
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I
THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in its decision in Canterbury v. Spenceo forcefully asserted the
rights of a patient to determine what should he done with his or her body.
Plaintiff Jerry Canterbury, a nineteen-year-old boy, had submitted to
an operation performed by the defendant, a surgeon, without being told
that there was a minimal risk of paralysis7 associated with the procedure.s
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in his performance
of the operation and in his failure to inform his patient of the risk in-
volved. The doctor claimed that it was not good medical practice to com-
municate such risks because such knowledge might deter patients from
undergoing needed surgery.9 Circuit Judge Spottswood Robinson III,
6. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The CanterbUry interpretation of patients' rights
may well ronfiict with the Supreme Court's most recently expressed views on tIle
issue in Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.S. 179 (1973).
In both Roe and Doe the Court roncluded that the ronstitutionally protected right
of privacy enrompassed a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, but held that
this right was nevertheless subject to the state's interest in safeguarding health. 410
u.s. at 154-63. Justice Blackmun relied upon two earlier Supreme Court decisions, one
upholding the state's power to require vaccination, Jarobson v. Massachusetts, 197
u.s. 11 (1905), and another upholding the state's power to sterilize rongenital mental
jlefectives, Buck v. Bell, 274 u.S. 200 (1927), to determine that the Court did not
rerognize an "unlimited right" to do with one's body as one pleases. 410 u.S. at 154.
The Court explicitly made the abortion decision a "medical" one, even during the
first trimester, by placing responsibility with the physician:
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to
this "rompelling" point, the attending physician, in ronsultation with Ills patient,
is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in his medical judg.
ment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is readied,
the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
410 U.s. at 163 (emphasis added). See id. at 166. This roncept is fundamentally ron.
trary to Canterbury, which purposefully located final decision.making power in the
patient. 464 F.2d at 780.
Similarly, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Justice Blackmun held that the
hospital review rommittee, required by Georgia's abortion statute, was unconstitutional
in that it invaded the doctor's right to administer medicine and the woman's right to
receive care in acrordance with her physician's best judgment. 410 u.S. at 197. Only
Justice Douglas, in his roncurring opinion in Doe, suggested that there was a strong
ronstitutional basis for personal health rights in addition to their traditional common
law foundations. Id. at 213. See also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hasp., 211 N.Y.
125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
7. The risk of paralysis inhered in the procedure (464 F.2d at 779) and therefore
required a warning. The plaintiff's rondition, however, may also have been caused
by a trauma resulting from an accidental fall during the post.operative period. Id.
at 778.
8. Id. at 777. In Canterbury, the risk was assessed at approximately "one percent,"
Id. at 778. It must be noted that the significance of any risk varies with the potential
injury and the expected gain. Thus, the actual numeric figure attached to the risk
is without independent meaning.
9. Id.
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reversing the defendant's directed verdict and remanding the case for a new
trial, held that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case of the physician's
violation of his duty to disclose, and that it remained for a jury to decide
whether such failure actually caused the plaintiff's injury.I0
The court relied on what it deemed a "fundamental" principle of
American jurisprudence that "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body.
• • •"11 In order to exercise the right to choose, the patient is dependent
upon the physician to inform him or her of the benefits, riskslZ and alter-
natives available."13 Hence, the law requires "reasonable divulgence"14 by
the physician as to each of these factors whenever a question arises as to
whether a "particular treatment procedure"lG should be undertaken.Ill
The Canterbury decision is particularly significant because, in addi-
tion to recognizing the commonplace duty to disclose,11 it rejected outright
the prevailing judicial practice of requiring e.xpert medical testimony to
define what constitutes acceptable physician-patient communication.I8
The court concluded that no consensus existed on this issue within the
medical profession,19 that each case presented such different circumstances
10. Id. at 779.
11. Id. at 780, quoting Cardozo, J., in Schloendorff Y. Socicty of N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
12. The duty to disclose encompasses potential or collateral dangers as well as
inherent ones. 464 F.2d at 782.
13. Id. at 780, 782.
14. In distinguishing the "duty of disclosurc" from thc doctrinc of "informed
consent," the court noted that the focus in disclosurc cases must bc on the reasonable-
ness of the extent of the physician's effort to communicate information, rather than
on the patient's comprehension of the situation. Id. at 780 n.15. Furthermore, the
physician's duty exists whether or not the patient has asked for any information. As
the court phrased it, "[c]aveat emptor is not the norm for thc consumer of medical
services:' Id. at 783 n.36.
15. The phrase "particular treatment procedure" includes but is not limited to
surgery; the duty to disclose arises before commencement of any medical treatment,
and implicitly extends to the risks of medications, ph}'Sical therapies, and other non-
surgical procedures. See id. at 781. The requirement thus goes bc}"Ond the procedures
for which a physician normally obtains 'ITitten consent. Sec, e.g., thc consent forms
presented in Morris, Crawford, and Morritz, Doctor and Patient and the Law 170·80
(5 ed. 1971). Accord, Cobbs Y. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 CaL Rptr. 505
(1972); Wilkinson Y. Vesey, 110 R.I. --J 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
16. 464 F.2d at 782.
17. See, e.g., Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 94346 (3d Cir. 1970) (appl}ing
Pennsylvania law); Campbell Y. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1250·51 (6th Cir. 1970) (appl}ing
Tennessee law).
18. 464 F.2d at 783. Compare Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538 (DoD.e. 1972),
decided one day before Canterbury and requiring expert testimony on the disclosure
issue. See Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960), discussed in text
accompanying notes 74-78 infra. See also Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 19&5)
(holding that expert testimony is required on this issuc); Washington Hoop. Center
v. Batter, 384 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ze Barth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81
Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d I, 52 A.LR.3d 1067 (1972).
19. 464 F.2d at 783.
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that a search for a general custom was inappropriate,20 and that the rights
of patients "demand[ed]" a standard set "by law for physicians rather than
one which physicians mayor may not impose upon themselves."21
Having rejected the general method of determining the scope of a
doctor's duty to disclose,22 the court substituted its own test dictated by
the "patient's need":23 a physician must convey to a patient all material
information the latter needs to make an "intelligent" decision (i.e., the
inherent and potential hazards of the treatment,24 the alternatives to the
treatment, and the results of non-treatment).2G The court proposed that
the jury consider whether all "material"26 information had been conveyed
and whether a reasonable person27 would have been "likely to [have]
attach[ed] significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether
or not to forego the proposed therapy."28
Canterbury also redefined the two long-standing exceptions to the
rule of disclosure. The first exception was identified as the "emergency"
situation which exists only when a person is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of consenting to treatment,20 when the failure to treat would
result in imminent harm, and when the harm threatened outweighs any
harm of the proposed treatment.30 Before performing any procedure, the
physician must attempt to secure the consent of a relative of the patient
if possible.31 The court explained that while expert testimony of common
20. Id. at 784. The court did not preclude introduction of cvidencc of professional
custom but explained that such testimony cannot "furnish the tcst for" thc standard
of care. Id. at 785.
21. Id. at 784.
22. See cases cited in note 18 supra.
23. Id. at 786. "[T]he patient's right of self·decision shapes the boundarics of
the duty to reveal." Id.
24. Id. at 782. See note 8 supra. Statistically small risks would not automatically
be excluded from disclosure. Id. at 788.
25. Id. at 787·88. Compare Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy
for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 Yale L.J. 1533 (1970) [hercinafter cited as
Restructuring Informed Consent], cited with approval, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36.
26. 464 F.2d at 786. The Canterbury court never formulated a precise definition
of the word "material." The court noted that individual insignificant risks may achlcve
materiality in combination (id. at 788 n.89); nonctheless a physician need not com·
municate infOrlllation of which an average person already would be aware or that
would be of no "apparent materiality." Id. at 788.
27. Reasonable in "what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's
position." Id. at 787.
28. Id. at 787, quoting Waltz 8: Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64
Nw. U.L. Rev. 628, 640 (1970).
29. 464 F.2d at 788. Interestingly, the court never defined the characteristics of
"a patient incapable of giving consent." See id. at 782 n.32. Sec also notes 105 &:
115·39 infra and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 788. It is unclear whether an "cmergency" is limited to situations
where a patient's life is endangered. Cf. the broader definition of "emergency" in
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2504(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
31. 464 F.2d at 789.
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medical practice is relevant, it is not controlling in proving the existence
of such an emergency.32
The second exception is the "therapeutic privilege," under which a
physician may withhold information from any patient whom the doctor
believes is so distraught that disclosure would be detrimental to his well-
being.33 Mter criticising the grant of such wide discretion,:H the court
carefully circumscribed this privilege by placing upon the defendant-
physician the burden of proof that the privilege was properly e.xercised.:JG
In assessing the propriety of the physician's use of the privilege, the
physician's decision alone is insufficient legal support; rather, there must
be independent evidence of the patient's emotionally unstable condition
and of disclosure to one of his relatives.:JlI
Under Canterbury, the plaintiff has the burden of going fomard
'with evidence as well as the burden of proof to show that the physician
failed to disclose material information and thereby caused the plaintiff's
injury.31 The court explained that the requisite causal connection can
exist only when the jury finds that a prudent person in circumstances
similar to the plaintiff-patient38 would have declined treatment had he
knmm of the risks involved.39 Each of these elements may be proved suc-
cessfully 'without any expert testimony.40 The court, however, did recog-
nize a possible need to call expert witnesses to give opinions on teclmical
medical questions or on the existence of an e.xception to the disclosure
rule.4l Finally, the court protected the rights of patients by classifying
the physician's omissions as negligence, rather than the intentional tort




34. Id. Many legal commentators share the court's disfavor. Sec, e.g., Restructur-
ing Informed Consent, supra note 25, at 1533. For the moral and cthical :lJ'SUD1ents
in favor of full disclosure from a physician's point of view, see J. Fletcher, Morals
and Medicine, ch. 2 (1960).
35. 464 F.2d at 791.
36. See id. at 791, 794.
37. Id. at 791. However, the ph}'Sician has the burden of going Com'aId with
evidence pertaining to the existence of a privilege. Id.
38. The court detailed the distinction between the "objectivc" test it h:Jd ch=
and the alternative of a "SUbjective" test. Id. at 790·91. See W. Prosser, The Law
of Torts § 32, at 149-50 (4th cd. 1971).
39. 464 F.2d at 791. Thus the testimony of the plaintiff is relcvant but not dis-
positive of this causality clement. The "materiality" of the information withheld
will actually be the most crucial factor to a finding of negligence in the ph}"Sician's
non-disclosure.
40. Id. at 791-92 8: n.124. See generally notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
41. Id. at 791-92.
42. Id. at 793.
43. But see Ray v. Schcibert, __ Tenn. App. 484 S.W.2d 63 (1972) (plain-
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Canterbury represents a considerable movement away from tradi-
tional physician privileges and creates substantial rights of self·determina-
tion for patients. The District of Columbia court's thoughtful discussion
of these issues was soon followed by two state supreme court decisions
in Rhode Island and California.
In Wilkinson v. Vesey, 44 the plaintiff, who had received extensive
x-ray treatment for a "shadow" in her chest, and who subsequently had
eight operations to graft skin and remove much of her thoracic structure,
claimed that her physicians were negligent in their diagnosis, their ad-
ministration of the treatment and their failure to obtain her knowing
consent prior to treatment.45 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island re-
versed a lower court's directed verdict for the defendant-physicians and
held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to send her case
to the jury.46 Reminiscent of Canterbury, the court held that the physi-
cians' failure to obtain knowing consent gave rise to a claim of negli-
gence;47 that expert testimony, while relevant, would not be determinative
of such a claim;48 that a decision to undergo treatment is the patient's
tiff's suit barred by the statute of limitations because a physician's failure to ade·
quately inform his patient was held to constitute a battery),
There are other ramifications of pleading a claim of battery rather than a claim
of negligence. To prove battery, the patient must show that the physician "touclted"
him without authorization. The touching itself is the injury and entitles the "victim"
to punitive or nominal damages as well as consequential damages for actual result-
ing harm. A physician's malpractice insurance may not cover liability arising
from an intentional tort. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 602 P.2d
I, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 61-
73 infra. For an enumeration of the elements of the negligence cause of action,
see Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N,Y.U.L.
Rev. 548, 549-51 (1973). For elaboration of the differences between negligence and
battery actions, see, e.g., McCold, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 381, 423·25 (1957), and other articles cited in 464 F.2d lit
793 n.130. It has been argued, however, that when expert testimony determines the
standard for measuring a physician's duty of disclosure, it makes little substantive
difference (beyond the distinction in applicable statutes of limitlltions) whether the
plaintiff's suit is in battery or negligence. See Restructuring Informed Consent, supra
note 25, at 1557 n.67. Fraud offers a third possible cause of action. Such a suit requires
proof that the physician knowingly misled the patient to induce him or her to
consent. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971).
44. 110 R.I. __, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). There had also been an earlier decision
in the case holding tItat the statute of limitations did not bar the action. Wilkinson
v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968).
45. 110 R.I. at -> 295 A.2d at 681.
46. 110 R.I. at -> 295 A.2d at 681, 685.
47. The court distinguished its own earlier ruling Nolan v. Kcchijian, 76 R.I. 165,
64 A.2d 866 (1949), and held that recovery for the intentional tort of battery was
appropriate only when the "procedure is completely unauthorized"; inadequate dIs.
closure, in contrast, raised a claim of negligence. 110 R.I. at -' 295 A.2d at 686.
See also note 43 supra.
48. 110 R.I. at __, 295 A.2d at 687-88. The court used the Canterbury rationale
to eliminate the need for expert testimony. See notes 17·21, 40 &: 41 supra and accom.
panying text.
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undeniable right;49 and that local medical community practice does not
set the standard for sufficient disclosure.llo Further paralleling Canterbury~
Wilkinson held that adequacy of disclosure should be determined by a
jury on the basis of the "materiality" of the facts;lll thus the physician has
no duty to disclose those risks a patient is likely to or actually does know
on the basis of past experience.1l2 Also as in CanteTbury~ one of the ele-
ments of the plaintiff's case is proof that, had he been duly informed of
the risk of the procedure, he would not have given his consent.li3
The Wilkinson opinion, however, deviates from Canterbury in a few
respects.54 Wilkinson's extremely strong language, apparently granting
the patient an absolute right of choice, goes somewhat beyond the Canter-
bury holding, which took careful account of the emergency situation.lll>
Further, the Rhode Island court addressed the problem of adversity be-
n....een the physician and patient on the necessity of the disclosure.GO Third,
49. Ill. at -' 295 A.2d at 688.
50. Id. at-' 295 A.2d at 688. See Torts, 1973/74 Ann. Sllr\'cy Am. 1.. 131.
51. 110 R.I. at -' 295 A.2d at 688-89, also citing Waltz 8: Scheuneman, supra
note 28, at 640, for the definition of "materiality."
52. 110 R.I. at -' 295 A.2d at 689, and cases cited therein.
53. Id. at -' 295 A.2d at 690. In addition, the Rhodc Island oourt profcrrcd
an argument (derived from 2 F. Harper 8: F. James, Law of Torts § 17.1 n.15 (Supp.
1968», which distinguished the usual malpractice cases, wherc the ph)'Sician and
patient share the oommon goal of effecting a cure, from the duty·to-disclose cascs,
where the views of the ph}'Sician and patient might be di\'ergent. The patient may
object to the physician's suggested treatment because risks in the patient's view out-
weigh the advantages. The Wilkinson oourt stated definitively that
every oompetent [adult has the] right to forego treatment, or e\'en cure, if it
entails what for him are intolerable oonsequenccs or risks howcver unwise his
sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical profession, or c\'en the
oommunity.
110 R.I. at -' 295 A.2d at 687. Acoord, Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 l\fisc. 2d 27, 252
N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (finding final authority rested with the patient to refuse
a life-saving blood transfusion). While the oourt failed to deal with the emergency
situation (oompare Canterbury. discussed in notes 29·32 supra and acoompanying tcxt),
Harper and James propose that in a situation where an adult, voluntarily hospitalized,
refuses life saving treatment, his desire should prcvail. Harper &: James, supra. But lICe
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 u.s. 978 (1964) upholding hospital's administration of a
life saving blood transfusion to an objecting adult patient who was a JehO\'a!1's
Witness); Jehovah's Witnesses of Wash. v. King County Hasp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.s. 598 (1968). John F. Kennedy Mem. Hasp. ".
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1973). For discussion of an adult's first
amendment right to refuse medical treatment see Note, Compulsory Medical Treat-
ment and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 Indo 1..J. 386 (1967).
54. See 110 R.I. at-' 295 A.2d at 688, where the oourt Slates that its reasoning
is different from Canterbury's.
55. 464 F.2d at 788-89. Wilkinson only mentioned thc emergency situation indo
dentally, quoting Schloendorff V. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914), which restricted such situations to times when a patient is w\oonscious
and in need of immediate surgery.
56. 110 R.I. at -' 295 A.2d at 687. See note 53 supra.
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the Wilkinson decision arguably extended Canterbury by imposing
the burden of disclosure upon all physicians of the treatment team.tiT
Also, the Rhode Island court never explicitly assigned the burden
of proof of the validity of non-disclosure.tiS This distinction between the
opinions, however, may be only superficial since the language in Willdn-
son suggests that, as in Canterbury, a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence arises once the plaintiff has demonstrated the physician's failure to
disclose material facts. tiD Finally, in contrast to both Canterbury's careful
discussion and Wilkinson's own generally broad statement of patients'
rights, the Rhode Island court left a potential "loophole" in its protection
by merely noting the therapeutic privilege doctrine without defining its
scope or appropriate application.6o
The third major decision on a doctor's duty to disclose was issued
seven days after Wilkinson by the Supreme Court of California sitting en
banc in Cobbs v. Grant.6! In Cobbs, defendant-physician appealed a jury's
general verdict of negligence as unsupported by the evidence and chal-
lenged the trial court's instructions on informed consent.62 The Supreme
Court of California held that, in the face of medical facts "not commonly
susceptible of comprehension by a lay juror," plaintiff's failure to intro-
duce expert testimony in support of his claim of negligence by a physician
for performance of surgery required a reversal of the judgment.oa Because
57. Ill. at -' 295 A.2d at 689. In Wilkinson, a radiologist was includcd
within this zone of duty. Canterbury probably failed to deal with this issue bccause
the complaint at bar had named only one defendant, the operating surgeon. This
oversight is unfortunate since it leaves open the question of who must make disclosures
when treatment involves more than one physician.
58. Compare Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791, placing this burden on the ph}'Siclan.
See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
59. no R.I. at-> 295 A.2d at 688.
60. The court simply stated:
The imposition of a duty of making disclosure is tempered by the recognition
that there may be a situation where a disclosure should not be made because it
would unduly agitate or undermine an unstable patient.
Id. at -> 295 A.2d at 689. See also Univ. of Pa, Health Law Project, 8 Materials
on Health Law, 34 (unpublished, rev'd ed. 1972). See also notes 88-86 supra and
accompanying text.
61. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). The patient, Cobbs, suf,
fered various infectious complications, requiring repeated surgery, which had arisen
from the removal of a duodenal ulcer. Although Cobbs had consented to the initial
surgery at the recommendation of his family doctor and the defendant surgeon, Dr.
Grant, neither physician had warned him of the inherent risks in the operation. ld.
at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
62. Id. at 236, 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 509. For an earlier decision in
the case on a different issue, see 100 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. App. 1972).
63. 8 Cal. 3d at 236, 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 509. The court refused to
find that this case fit within the "common knowledge exception." ld. at 237, 502 P.2d
at 5-6, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 509. Compare Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791·92, where the
District of Columbia court also recognized the need for medical (expert) testimony
for certain purposes such as determining the "risks of therapy and the consequences
of leaving existing maladies untreated." Ie\. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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the jury had rendered a general verdict and the grounds for liability could
have been either negligence in his decision to operate or in his perfor-
mance of the surgery, or alternatively, failure to obtain informed consent,
the court remanded the case for a new trial. Recognizing that the question
of informed consent would probably arise on retrial, the court e.xpounded
guidelines similar to the Canterbury standards for instructing the jury.'H
The court further clarified California law by effectively following Canter-
bury and Wilkinson to hold that failure to make adequate disclosure may
lead to a claim of negligence.G5 The physician owes his patients a "duty of
reasonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to proposed
therapy and of the dangers inherently and potentially involved in each."clJ
Fulfillment of such duty should be measured by general community,
rather than medical, standards of reasonableness.G7 In viewing the physi-
cian-patient relationship as "fiducial" rather than paternalistic,68 the
court held that the patient's need for information measures the scope of
the physician's duty.69 While summarily recognizing the traditional e.x-
ceptions to the above rule in cases where an emergency e.xists70 or where
64. 8 Cal. 3d at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508. Sec alro Canterbury,
464 F.2d at 786.
65. 8 Cal. 3d at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512. Dattery was rcstTieted
to "those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient
has not consented." 1<1. See Berkey v. Anderson, I Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 CaL Rptr. 67
(1969) (failure to disclose risks inherent in an e.xploratory SUrgical operation could
constitute a technical battery). Cf. Dow v. Kaiser Foundation, 12 CaL App. 3d 488,
90 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1970) (proof of willfully withheld material information without
good medical reason is required to establish the claim of battCl"}'); Carmichael v. Reitz,
17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971) (failure to disclose constituted negli.
gence). The trend in other jurisdictions is not yet uniform. Sec, e.g., Ray v. Scheibcrl,
__ Tenn. App. -> 484 S.W.2d 63 (1972). Sec note 43 supra.
66. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 1M CaL Rptr. at 514. The coun explicitly
protected physicians for non-disclosure of minor or commonly known risks with rela-
tively uncomplicated procedures. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at II, 1M Cal. Rptr. at
515. Cf. note 15 supra. Compare Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788, which, while e.xcepting
commonly known Tisks or those risks of which the patient is already aware, refused
to limit the rule according to the size of the probability of the hazard occurring or
the complexity of the procedure.
67. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 1M Cal. Rptr. at 514. The court used reason.
ing similar to that in Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782, and TVilltinson, IlO R.I. at ->
295 A.2d at 687. Cobbs rejected the prevailing "medical community" standards rule
as "needlessly overbroad" because it gave "virtual absolute discretion" to the ph)'Si.
ciano 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 1M Cal. Rptr. at 514.
68. 8 Cal. 3d at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
69. 1<1. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 CaL Rptr. at 515, quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d
at 786, using the "materiality" standard.
70. 8 CaL 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. Cobbs did not define
the term "emergency" (but see Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788). but held that when such
a situation occurs, consent may be implied. Compare treatment of this issue in
Wilkinson where the court merely alluded to the problem. IlO R.I. at~ 295 A.2d
at 685.
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the patient is a minor or incompetent,71 the Cobbs court expressly tried
to narrow the California interpretation of therapeutic privilege by placing
the burden of proof as to its applicability upon the physician.72 Finally,
under Cobbs, as in Canterbury and Wilkinson, the plaintiff must prove
that, had he known the risks, he would have foregone the treatment.711
As demonstrated by the foregoing summary, Canterbury, Wilkinson,
and Cobbs represent a significant change in tort law. The magnitude of
the departure is highlighted by a comparison of these three cases with
Natanson v. Kline,74 the landmark decision prior to Canterbury on physi-
cians' duty to disclose. Decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1960,
Natanson imposed a legal duty on physicians to make reasonable dis-
closures to patients concerning the inherent hazards of a given treatment711
and held that a doctor who had told his patient nothing of the risks of
cobalt treatment failed as a matter of law in his duty towards hcr.70
Natanson provided that the jury, as laymen, should decide whether any
disclosure was made; but, in contrast to the 1972 decisions,77 the adequacy
of that disclosure was held to turn on reasonable medical practice and
therefore necessitated expert testimony.78
Possible explanations for the change in judicial orientation since
Natanson are the articulation of new theories in the areas of patients'
rights and tort law, and the recognition of the need to divest the physician
of some of his unlimited power over a patient's body. Each of the 1972
decisions has as its implicit purpose the alleviation of plaintiffs' problems
71. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The court failed to
define the term "incompetent," but did state that when treating such a patient, the
physician must obtain consent from the patient's legal guardian or closest available
relative. Id.
72. The physician must show by a
preponderance of the evidence [that] he relied upon facts which would demon·
strate to a reasonable man that disclosure would have so seriously upset the
patient that the patient would not have been able to dispassionately weigh the
risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment.
8 Cal. 3d at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516. Accord, Canterbury, 464 F.2d
at 789.
73. 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at II, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
74. 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
75. Id. at 189, 354 P.2d at 673.
76. Id.
77. Only one decision before Canterbury had eliminated the requirement of
expert testimony on the adequacy of disclosure. In Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,
377 P.2d 520 (1962), the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that physicians have a
duty to disclose the nature, consequences and risks of treatments and tltat the suffi.
ciency of any disclosure was an issue for the jury. Unlike Canterbury, WilMnson or
Cobbs, the plaintiff did not have to prove that the undisclosed knowledge would have
deterred her from undergoing the therapy. The court may have reached this con.
clusion, however. as a result of evidence that the physician had affirmatively misled
the patient by unwarranted reassuring statements.
78. 187 Kan. at 189, 354 P.2d at 673. Accord, W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § BB
(4th ed. 1971).
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in securing favorable expert 'witnesses,79 and eqch of the courts apparently
were 5\'layed by legal commentators who had criticized tlle requirement
of such testimony.80 Each opinion aspired to a physician'patient relation-
ship based upon mutual trust.81 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
epitomized the thesis of these recent decisions in its statement that "more
communication between doctor and patient means less litigation bet"leen
patient and doctor."82
While only future applications will demonstrate the true viability
of these new guidelines,83 there are already several points of confusion
evident in the decisions.84 None of the courts detailed disclosure require-
ments for treatments other than surgery.85 Although Cobbs excludes
"common procedures" from the disclosure requirement, no definition of
what constitutes such a procedure is formulated.so Moreover, the scope
of the therapeutic and emergency privileges still remains ill-defmed.61
Finally, these expanded concepts of patients' rights may be difficult to
implement in view of the economic realities of the delivery of health
care, particularly in clinics where a revolving set of doctors continually
meet new patients and administer short-term treatments.88
79. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792; Wilkinson, 110 R.I. at -' 295 A.2d at 657;
Cobbs, 8 CaL 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513. Acoord, 2 F. H3rpcr 8:
F. James, The Law of Torts § 17.1 n.15 (Supp. 1968).
80. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 779, relying on Waltz 8: Schcuncm:m, In-
formed Consent to Therapy, supra note 28, and on Restructuring Informed Consent,
supra note 25, at 1533 (1970); Wilkinson, 110 R.I. at -J 295 A.2d at 685, 687, rcl)"
ing upon 'Waltz 8: Scheuneman, supra, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 25,
and Harper 8: James, supra note 79; Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 2·13, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 514, referring to Comment, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1445 (1962), and Waltz 8:
Scheuneman, supra.
81. Cf. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782; Wilkinson, 110 R.I. at -J 295 A.2d at 690;
Cobbs, 8 CaL 3d at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
82. 110 R.I. at -J 295 A.2d at 690.
83. For the purposes of this discussion the writers consider the stand:rrds promul-
gated by the three courts to be essentially the same.
84. Many questions inevitably arise from the courts' language formulating the
patients' right to informed consent. In addition, consider related questions such as
who "owns" or should have access to patients' medical records, if they actually have an
expansive right to know? See Dep't of Health, Educ. 8: Welfare, Repon of the Secrc:-
tary's Comm'n on Medical Malpractice, Publication No. (OS) 73-88 (1973) (hereinafter
cited as HEW Report). See also Univ. of Pa. Health Law Project, 8 Materials on Health
Law 62 (unpublished, rev'd ed. 1972).
85. Cf. note 15 supra.
86. See note 66 supra.
87. See notes 29-36, 55, 60 8: 70-72 supra and accompanying text. See Note,
Consent to Surgery-A Dilemma, 37 Albany L Rev. 591 (1973), for a rc\'ieI'J of incon-
sistent judicial definitions in New York of the term "emergency."
88. See HEW Report, supra note 84, at 3. There arc many unanswered practical
questions which arise particularly in this conte.xt: Do the courts' guidelines achie\'e
the "delicate balance between the right of the patient to choose the treatment he
wishes to undergo and the freedom of the physician to practice responsible and progres-
sive medicine without fear of frequent litigation"? (Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940,
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The impact of the Callterbury, Wilkinson, and Cobbs decisions has
been disappointing thus far since both federal and state courts have relied
upon the traditional standards. For example, in a malpractice suit in·
volving a well-known heart specialist, a federal district court in Texas
directed a verdict for the defendant and followed earlier Texas law to
hold that the duty of a physician to disclose information is measured by
the community medical practice.so Furthermore, using vague language,
the court designed a broad version of the therapeutic privilege permitting
"each doctor [to] use his medical judgment as to whether certain dis·
closures of risks would have an adverse effect on the patient so as to
jeopardize the success of the proposed therapy."oo
A federal district court in Pennsylvania also supported a physician's
right to determine the sufficiency of his disclosure to his patients in
Ciccarone v. United States.01 While noting that Pennsylvania law required
a physician to obtain informed consent, the district court dismissed
plaintiff's claim that the physician had negligently discharged this duty,
even though he had failed to tell the patient of the alternatives available
to the proposed treatment. The court reasoned that it could not "place a
doctor in the position of talking a patient out of treatment which he [the
physician] reasonably believe[d] to be necessary and safe."o2
In Collins v. Itoh,03 the Supreme Court of Montana endorsed tile
discretionary powers of a physician by affirming a directed verdict in favor
of a physician-defendant in a malpractice action. The court, in the face of
unusually significant omissions by the defendant surgeon, rejected tile
patient's claim that the physician had breached his duty to disclose.o4
The court held that the plaintiff had failed to produce the expert testi·
942 (D.c. Cir. 1970), cited in Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780). Has the physician tIle time
to make a disclosure adequate to the courts' requirements? Is there a real opportunity
for the patients' right of self-determination to be observed in the pressured atmosphere
of a busy urban clinic? How can sucl1 a right find expression when health care is
economically beyond the reacl1 of some?
89. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 833 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
90. Id. at 834, quoting earlier Texas cases. The decision, however, may be ex·
plained by the facts at bar. The court had heard persuasive testimony that the physl.
cians had explained the nature of the heart surgery in detail to both the deceased
patient and his widow, the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff's credibillty was under·
cut because previously she had been most pleased with the physicians' efforts on ller
husband's behalf, having written numerous laudatory letters on the subject. 849 F.
Supp. at 829-32.
91. 350 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
92. Id. at 563.
93. 160 Mont. -' 503 P.2d 36 (1972).
94. Id. at -' 503 P.2d at 40-41. The court's decision is striking because the
physician had not only failed to warn the patient, prior to her thyroidectomy, of the
potential risks involved, but also post-operatively had withheld the fact that during
the operation he had inadvertently removed the parathyroid (four small endocrine
glands located adjacent to the thyroid). Id., 503 P.2d at 40.
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mony on medical custom and practiceD::; needed to establish the doctor's
negligence.96
In another recent case,n a Louisiana appellate court sharply diverged
from the Canterbury concept that a patient has the right to control what
is done lvith her body.9s A woman charged her physicians with malprac-
tice in their performance of a modified radical hysterectomy. She further
alleged that she had not consented to as extensive surgery as was per-
formed.99 The court affirmed the lower court's verdict for the defendants
and granted the doctor lvide discretion on the basis of the patient's
general consent to the operation.IOO
In conclusion, there is still a lack. of unanimity on the breadth of a
physician's duty to disclose to patients the risks of treatments.IOI While
the obvious thrust of Canterbury is to limit the prerogative of a physician
and to enforce the right of a patient to choose the therapy he will undergo,
it remains to be seen whether other courts lvill adopt its position largely
rejecting the requirement of expert testimony and the broad therapeutic
privilege. As the fear of malpractice suits against physicians grows and the
concern of patients for proper care continues,I02 the need for a clear and
practical rule lvill intensify.
II
THE PATIENT'S AnILITY TO GIVE CONSENT
THE ELEJ\.ffiNTS OF CONSENT: A CASE STUDY-MENTALLY ILL PATIENTS
As discussed in Part I, many courts within the last year have
explored a physician's duty to disclose information and obtain informed
consent;I03 none of these cases, however, actually addressed the issue of
who is capable of giving such consent. Although some of the courts raised
the issue of competency to consent by noting Justice Cardozo's words that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to de-
95. Id. at -> 503 P.2d at 41. See Negaard v. Estate of Feda, 152 Mont. 47, 446
P.2d 436 (1968) (using the medical rather than a community standard of ClfC).
96. 160 Mont. at -> 503 P.2d at 41.
97. Bryant v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 448 (La. App. 1973).
98. 464 F.2d at 780.
99. 272 So. 2d at 453.
100. Id. The court stated that the general consent "included her consent Cor the
surgeon to perform whatever was necessary to remove the potentially dangerous ClJl-
cerous tissues." Id.
101. Cf. Torts, 1966 Ann. SUITey Am. L 209, 232. Under pre-Canterbury doctrines,
the authors commented on the unsettled law at that time and concluded that only
in cases where adverse circumstances were certain (e.g., sterilization) was a burden
clearly placed upon a ph}'Sician to detail the risks to his patient.
102. See National Broadcasting Co. Reports, Hospitals, Doctors, and Patients,
transcript of telecast September 22, 1973, available upon written request to the com·
pany at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York.
103. See, e.g., note 5 supra.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1973 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 100 1973-1974
100 1973/1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
tennine what shall be done with his own body,"104 these opinions did not
interpret his statement or explain how to apply the criteria he expounded.
However, a Michigan circuit court confronted the question directly in
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health10G when it deter·
mined whether an adult male, involuntarily confined in a mental hospital,
could give legally valid consent to an experimental psychosurgical proce·
dure. This decision, issued at a time when great attention is being focused
on the rights of the confined mentally ill,106 has critical implications for
the physician-patient relationship and raises considerable questions as to
the practical accuracy of Cardozo's statement.
Kaimowitz was decided by the Circuit Court for the County of
Wayne, Michigan, on a writ of habeas corpus which charged that a John
Doe was being detained illegally for the purpose of experimental psycho-
surgery.I07 Doe, committed in 1955 under a subsequently repealed Crimi.
nal Sexual Psychopathic law,I08 was to serve as the only subject of an
experiment conducted by two physicians associated with the Michigan
Department of Mental Health and funded by the Michigan legislature.1Oo
The experiment had sought to compare the effects of psychosurgery on
the amygdaloid portion of the limbic system of the brain with the effects
of the drug cyproterone acetate on the male hormonal flow, in order to
ascertain if either method could control male aggression and thus relieve
a patient's suffering from rages.lIO Both John and his parents had signed
consent formsllI which detailed the goals of the operation, the nature of
104. In Schloendorff v. Society of N,Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914), quoted in Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780, and in Wilkinson, 110 R.I. at __,
295 A.2d at 685, and paraphrased in Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513,
502 P.2d at 9.
105. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73·19434·AW (Mich.
Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), noted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063) [All subsequent citations shall
refer to the slip opinion. Any relevant references appearing in the United States Law
Week report shall also be noted.]
106. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) appeal pending.
No. 72·2634 (5th Cir. 1972) and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. WIs.
1972), vacated and remanded for clarification of order, 42 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Jan. 15,
1974) (No. 73-568).
For a general discussion of the rights of mental patIents, see B. Ennis &: L. Siegel,
Rights of Mental Patients (1973); B. Ennis, Prisoners of Psychiatry (1972).
107. Civ. No. 73·19434-AW, at I, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2063.
108. See id. at 2 n.2. This provision is now codified at Mich. Compo Laws § 330.856
(Supp. 1973). See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
109. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 2-3. Doe was the only subject because the experl.
menters could not locate any other suitable patients. Id. at 3. The criteria for
the population were listed in the court's appendix. Id. at Appendix, Item 2, at 'l.
HO. Id. at 3. See id. at Appendix, Item 1, at 1 for a fuller explanation of the
experimental proposal.
HI. Id. at 4-5. There was some dispute, however, as to whether the parents had
agreed to all the procedures or only the initial stages. Id. at 5 n.6. In addition, tIle
patient withdrew his consent during the trial. Id. at 8 n.9. Nevertheless, the court had
held in its first opinion issued on March 15, 1973, that neither Doe's withdrawal of
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the procedure, and both the inherent and potential risks. After two spe-
cially appointed review committeesl12 had approved the treatment on
scientific, moral and ethical grounds, the doctors implanted depth elec-
trodes in John Doe's brain as the first stage of the e.xperiment.ll3 At this
point, plaintiff halted the project by filing suit as a representative of Doe
and a public interest group, the "Medical Committee for Human
Rights."1l4
A three-judge court, in an opinion issued in March of 1973, declared
Doe's detention unconstitutional and later ordered his release.11G In
July of 1973, the same court issued its landmark and unanimous decision
that involuntarily detained mental patients are incapable of giving in·
formed, and therefore legally adequate, consent to experimental pSycllQ-
surgical procedures on the brain.116
There were two fundamental but intertwined bases for the latter
opinion: the unusually experimental and unpredictable nature of the
particular psychosurgical procedure117 and the involuntary incarceration
status of the patient.11S For the purposes of this case, the court defined
psychosurgery1l9 narrowly to be that psych5surgery whicll was highly
experimental,12o was rife 'with unknown risks121 and irreversible conse·
quences,122 and was of only indeterminate benefit to either the patient or
consent, nor his release after a finding that his detention was unconstitutional (see
note 115 infra and accompanying text) had rendered the issue moot. Id. at 7 &: n.8.
For the text of the consent form, sec id. at 3-4 n.5.
112. Id. at 5. The experimenters' themselves had created the committccs, one
called the Scientific Review Committee and the other, the Human Rights Re\'iew
Committee.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Medical Committee for Human Rights (MCHR) is a national orga·
nization of medical students and physicians which focuses its attention upon the
rights of patients and the delivery of health care. The case was apparently very well
briefed and argued by Dean Frances A. Allen and Prof. Robert A. Burt of the Uni·
versity of Michigan Law School, both appointed counsel for John Doc. Id. at 6, 41.
U5. Sec id. at 6. The criminal sexual psychopath statute under which John Doe
had been committed had been repealed by the Michigan legislature in 1968. Id. at 2 n.2-
116. Id. at 31, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064.
U7. Sec notes 119-23 infra and accompanying tc....t.
118. See notes 124, 131, 132, 135, 137 &: 138 infra and accompanying text. Because
of the unusual circumstances facing the Michigan court, it is possible that other
courts, confronted with less dramatic modes of treatment, may linlit the Kaimowitz
holding to its facts.
119. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 10, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2063. Other definitions of PS}"
chosurgery had been offered to the court and rejected by it. Id. at 9-10.
120. Id. at 26-27, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2063. Expert testimony established the experi.
mental nature of the procedure. See id. at 12, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2063.
121. Id. at 11-12, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2063. The court noted the constant interdepen.
dence among the areas of the brain. Id.
122. Id. at 12, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2063. Because of the biological fact that once brain
cells are destroyed, they do not regenerate, any ph}"Sical intervention in the brain
has "irreversible" consequences and is by definition a "treatment of last rcsort." Id.
Further, psychosurgery that has been done has been associated with a general blunting
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society.123 The court found the circumstances of an involuntarily confined
patient relevant because the inherently coercive nature of the institutions
which restrict an individual's activities often prompt patients to seek
special attention as a source of relief from this debilitating monotony.124
In reaching its decision to modify John Doe's ability to consent to
these procedures, the court considered elementary tort"law. Holding that
"informed consent is a requirement of variable demands," the court
noted the increased importance of consent in experimental procedures12tl
and the heightened need for close scrutiny of the adequacy of that con-
sent.126 The court outlined the standard elements of informed consent
as competency, knowledge, .and voluntariness.l27 It then analyzed whether
an involuntarily confined mental patient could ever fulfill these cri-
teria.12S
The court defined "competency" as "the ability of tlle subject to
understand rationally the nature of the procedure, its risks, and other
relevant information."129 Significantly, the court never suggested tlmt
either an individual's mental illnessI30 or his confinement were dispositive
of this issue. Rather, the itlvoluntary detention undermined a patient's
capacity to consent to the psychosurgical procedure, and was tllUS one
of emotions and a reduction in spontaneous behavior, a loss of capacity for learning
and an impairment of memory. Id. at 17, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064.
123. Id. at 13-17, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2063. There was no definitive evidence that this
surgical-medical treatment would ameliorate Doc's problem of violent behavior. Id.
124. Sec id. at 29, 33, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064.
125. Id. at 22, 42 U.S.LoW. at 2063-64. The court, citing J. Katz, Experimentation
with Human Beings 523 (1972), ascribed the following functions to consent: emphasiz-
ing the individual's right to choose, encouraging the subject to be an active partner,
encouraging the investigator to question his project, and increasing society's
awareness of the research. Civ. No. 73-19434·AW, at 19-20.
126. In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that its review of the consent
given varies with the nature of the treatment contemplated. "When a procedure Is
experimental, dangerous and intrusive, special safeguards are necessary." Id. at 22,
42 U.S.L.W. at 2063-64. Consider the implications for the duty·to·disclose cases, dis·
cussed at notes 1-102 and accompanying text. One might ask whether the requirements
of a physician's disclosure itself should vary with the procedure involved. Sec, e.g.,
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87, mandating that it is the patient's need for the In·
formation which governs the duty to disclose.
127. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 22, 31, 42 U.S.LoW. at 2064.
128. Id. at 22·32, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064, quoting the ten principles known as the
"Nuremberg Code," enumerated in the "Judgment of the Court in United States v.
Karl Brandt," Trial of War CriminaIs before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Vol.
I &: 2, "The Medical Case," U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Wash., D.C. (1948), reprinted in
Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings 305 (1972). Id. at 23·24. Sec 289 N. Eng.
J. Med. 325 (Aug. 9, 1973) for discussion on the problem of obtaining informed con·
sent in an institutionalized setting.
129. Id. at 25, '12 U.S.L.W. at 2064, and citing Waltz &: Sclteuneman, supra note 28.
See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
130. John Doe reportedly had an I.Q. of at least 80, and it was suggested that
he had sufficient mental acuity to comprehend both the treatment and his circum.
stances. Civ. No. 73·19434-AW, at 25.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1973 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 103 1973-1974
PATIENTS' RIGHTS 103
among several pertinent factors to be considered.l3l The court concluded
that the institutional setting here rendered John Doe, as well as a legal
guardian, incapable of giving consent to the proposed operation.l32 The
court further held that, since it had defined the psychosurgical procedure
as highly experimental,l33 satisfaction of the requirement of knowledge
of the risks 1\Ta5 "literally impossible."134 Finally, the voluntariness ele-
ment of informed consent was found to be fundamentally absent due to
the patient's long-term and involuntarily detained status.lSG
The court was careful to emphasize in its conclusion that neither the
psychosurgery procedure in general nor the coerced confinement for
mental health purposes was a complete bar to valid consent. If this psycho-
surgery ever became an accepted neurosurgical procedure, then "it is
possible, with appropriate review mechanisms,l3o that involuntarily de-
tained mental patients could consent to such an operation."l31 Further,
the court held that "an involuntarily detained mental patient today can
give adequate consent to accepted neurosurgical procedures."lS8 Neverthe-
less, until these conditions were satisfied, the court concluded that the
state had an obligation to prevent the experiment's occurrence.IS3
In addition to the common law bases for the holding, the Kaimowitz
court advanced "compelling constitutional considerations that preclude[d]
involuntarily detained mental patients from giving effective consent to
this type of surgery."140 Premising its discussion upon the fact that John
Doe was detained at the instance of the state, thereby implicating doc-
trines of state action,14l the court held that state authorization of e.xperi-
mental psychosurgery would violate Doe's right to freedom of speechu2
and to privacy.143 Using innovative analysis, the court determined that
131. This conclusion arguably should provoke closer scrutiny into COllSCJll gi\'en
by any patienl who is involuntarily confined and who agrees to treatment prottdurcs.
132. Id. at 25-26, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064. Sec nole 135 infra, and tcxt acwmpan)ing
note 124 supra.
133. See text acwmpanying notes 119-23 supra.
134. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 27, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064.
135. Id. at 28, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064. The court noted that the inequality of au-
thority between mental patients and the physicians clouds any choices by the latter.
Id. at 29, 42 u.s.L.W. at 2064. This fact raises doubts about conclusions that other
institutionalized patients can give voluntary and knowledgeable consent to less dramatic
treatments. Id. at 21, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064. Sec nole 131 supra.
136. Sec notes 125 & 126 supra and accompanying tc,xt.
137. Id. at 40.
138. Id.
139. This is an interesting posture for the court to take. While arguably an
admirable decision under the facts of this case, there is a potential Cor abuse since,
under the guise of paternalism, the state limits the options of an institutionalized
person.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id., 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064.
142. Id., 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064.
143. Id. at 36, 42 U.s.L.W. at 2064.
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the first amendment protections extended to the generation of ideas.144
In comparison to psychosurgery's potential to irreparably injure an in-
dividual's mental processes, the state was unable to demonstrate any
sufficiently compelling interests to warrant overriding the patient's first
amendment guarantees. Similarly, an individual's mind was also protected
under the Supreme Court's elusively defined right to privacy.l4G The
compelling state interest test was applied, and again the state's interest
was held inadequate to justify the intrusive medical procedure.140
While the logic of the Kaimowitz theory is enticing, that in order to
enjoy an "effective" freedom to speak. one must be able to think, it relies
upon debatable constitutional foundations.147 First of all, the United States
Supreme Court has not delineated what it considers "effective" speech.
No cases have actually mandated that there is any right to attain a certain
level of competence or that individuals possess uniform abilities to exercise
first amendment freedoms.l48 Second, the Kaimowitz court found no cases
in point and was therefore forced to rely upon general statements by legal
scholars and dicta in several earlier Supreme Court decisions.14o The
most probative precedent cited by the Michigan court was Stanley v.
Georgia}5° a case in which the Supreme Court implicitly recognized and
protected the interrelationship among the human mind, the right of
expression, and the right to privacy.lGl The Kaimowitz reasoning was
144. Id. at 35, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064. The court relied upon Stanley v Georgia, Il!H
U.S. 557 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Abrams v. United Slates.
250 U.S. 616 (1919); B. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, Selected Writings
of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 317-18 (1947); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963). Unfortunately the facts of Stanley
(the situs of the acts in question and the transitory nature of the activity (reading»
render the case easily distinguishable from Kaimowit1.; however, given the unique
nature of the Kaimowit1. litigation, the court was forced to reason by analogy.
145. Id. at 36, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064. The court reasoned that constitutional protec.
tion of one's mind is at least as deserving as other already recognized ideals. Sec
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (one's body); and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (one's home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1962) (marital bed).
146. Civ. No. 73-19434·AW, at 39, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064.
147. See note 144 supra.
148. Cf. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), where the
court rejected the appellants' equal protection argument that equal educational
opportunities were necessary to an informed and intelligent exercise of first amend.
ment freedoms by stating that there is no "guarantee to the citizenry of the most
effective speech." Id. at 35-36. In any case, it would always have to be recognized
that discrepancies will exist among individuals' innate capabilities. In addition, there
are many circumstances in which the Court has justified limitations on individuals'
right to exercise certain of their first amendment rights at all. See, e.g., United States
Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
149. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 144 & 145 supra.
150. 39 U.S. 557 (1969) (conviction for possession of obscene matter in private
held unconstitutional).
151. Id. at 564-66. The first amendment permits a person to "satisfy his Intellectual
and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home" and prohibits the government
from exercising control over people's minds and private thoughts. Id. at 565.
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also founded upon the preferred constitutional pOSluon of the first
amendment, upon the highly personal and thereby potentially funda-
mental nature of the rights involved, and upon the very unusual fact
situation presented.l52 It is disappointing, however, that the court did
not fully explore the implications of its constitutional premises nor detail
the controversial issues over which it glided.
In summary, the Kaimowitz court did not conclude that involuntarily
detained mental patients categorically lack the capacity to give informed
consent, but rather it recognized that there are procedures for which the
state could not allow such patients to give consent.lG3 The person who
is involuntarily institutionalized is specially situated by the state, which
must then afford him or her additional protections. One must note, how-
ever, that ostensible protections can function as disabilities and that the
result reached by the court means that the ambit of free choice with
respect to personal health decisionslG4 is further restricted for this class
of people.
Even before Kaimowitz, other courts had considered the ability of
mental patients to give consent to a proposed treatment. In New York
City Health and Hospitals Corp. v. Stein,lGG a city hospital had vol-
untarily applied for court authorizationl56 to give electroshock treatments
to an adult female patient, diagnosed as schizophrenic and involuntarily
retained,l57 who had refused to consent to the therapy. The hospital
sought to dispense with the patient's consent "on the ground that she
is incompetent to make a reasoned decision."lG8 The court rejected the
hospital's petition, reasoning that since the patient would suffer the
consequences of an erroneous decision, her refusal should be determina-
tive unless she lacked the mental capacity to "knowingly consent or
withhold her consent."l59 With this presumption of competency, the
court cautiously considered the conflicting testimony of the psychiatric
witnesses for both parties. Ordering further retention of the patient,
the judge nevertheless held that she did have the mental capacity to
refuse treatment.l60
152. This is apparently the only reported case dealing wim the problems invol\·cd
in psychosurgery. American Civil Liberties Union Newsletter (1973).
153. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914), and cited by Kaimowitz, Civ. No. 73·19434-AW, at 18.
155. 70 Mise. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.5.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
156. Ill. at 944-45, 335 N.Y.5.2d at 463. The hospital had applied under a statutc
which was not to take effect until the follOWing January. Sec N.Y. Mental Hn;ienc
Law § 15.03(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
157. See N.Y. Laws [1964], ch, 738, § 5, as amended, N.Y. Mental H)-gienc uw
§§ 31.27 &: 31.29 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
158. 70 1\.fise. 2d at 945, 335 N.Y.5.2d at 463.
159. Id. at 946, 335 N.Y.5.2d at 464.
160. Id. at 946-47, 335 N.Y.5.2d at 465.
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Both Stein and Kaimowitz lend support to the proposition that hos-
pitalized mental patients should not be presumed "incompetent" solely
as a result of their mental disability or their confinement. These deci-
sions each suggest that, as with any other patients, physicians have a
duty to disclose information to the mentally ill and must obtain their
informed consent before instituting therapy.161 Unfortunately, neither
of these cases addressed the problem of defining what characteristics or
what standard of proof are required to render an adult incompetent to
determine his medical treatment. Further, jurisdictions vary greatly on
the capacities they ascribe to the mentally ill. Some states, such as New
Jerseyl62 and New York,l63 provide by statute that hospitalization is not
presumptive of incompetency to exercise civil rights. Case law in New
York upholds the involuntarily detained's right to choose his hospital
statusl64 and to refuse treatment.16G In Wisconsin, however, involuntary
confinement in a mental institution raises a statutory rebuttable pre-
sumption of incompetency.l66
Legal procedures for evaluating incompetency to make personal
health decisions vary considerably. Where involuntary confinement is
evidence of incapacity, the commitment proceeding has been used as the
forum for the adjudication 'of an adult as incompetent to make medical
decisions;l67 but where detention by the state is not presumptive of in-
161. See "right to informed consent" cases cited at note 8 supra. See, e.g.,
Kaimowit%, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 18 &: n.18, 19·21, 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064. For a
similar conclusion on the more limited issue of the right to refuse hospitalization for
mental illness, see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094 (E.n. Wis. 1972), vacated
and remanded for clarification of order, 42 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974) (NO.
73-568) (holding unconstitutional Wisconsin's procedures for civil commitment of the
mentally ill).
162. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-24.2 (Supp. 1973). This section, entitled "Rights
of Patients," was applied in Bush v. Kallen, 123 N.J. Super. 175, 302 A.2d 142 (1973)
(patients' attorneys have authority to inspect their clients' medical records if patients
consent, in spite of patients' involuntary institutionalization).
163. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 29.03 (McKinney Supp. 1973). See also N.Y.
Mental Hygiene Law § 15.01 (McKinney Supp. 1973) which provides that "no person
shall be deprived of any civil rights ••• solely by reason of receipt of services for a
mental disability:'
164. See In re Buttenow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968),
discussed at notes 171-77 infra and accompanying text. See also In re Curry, 470 F.2d
368, 372 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
165. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), reversing a summary judg.
ment in defendants' favor on the ground that a hospital's psychiatric staff violated the
first amendment by forcibly administering medication over the patient's protests based
upon Christian Scientist beliefs. In its opinion, the court reaffirmed the general prln.
ciple that "[a]bsent a specific finding of incompetence, the mentnl patient retains his
right to sue or defend in his own name, to sell or dispose of his property, to marry,
to draft a will, and, in general to manage his own affairs:' Id. at 68.
166. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.005(2) (1951). See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for clarification of order, 42 U.S.L.W.
3402 (U.s. Jan. 15, 1974) (No. 73-568), enumerating other disabilities imposed by statute
upon those adjudged mentally ill in Wisconsin.
167. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (E.n. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded for clarification of order, 42 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974) (No. 78.568).
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capacity,16S no legal procedure exists to find a person incompetent to
consent to medical treatment. The general civil incompetency hearing
is usually inadequate for medical competency purposes because most state
statutes focus solely upon the ability of an individual to manage his
financial and proprietary affairs,169 a standard distinct from the evidence
relevant to competency to understand one's medical problems.
A second unresolved issue is the scope of authority of a court-ap-
pointed guardian, without specific court authorization, to make health
care decisions for an adjudicated incompetent.170 In the leading New
York case, In re Buttenow,171 the Court of Appeals of New York per-
mitted an adjudicated incompetent-and not her committee17:L- to de-
cide her hospitalization status.l73 Her committee had protested the
plaintiff's choice to become a voluntarily hospitalized patient because
the voluntary status lacked the procedural safeguards given to the in-
voluntary status.174 Judge Fuld first liberally construed the former New
York Mental Hygiene Law17[j to render it constitutional, holding that
there were the same safeguards for both categories.17lJ He then concluded
that "an adjudication of incompetency is in no way a decision or judg-
ment that the person so adjudicated may not act in matters involving his
personal status."177
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, courts have not yet articu-
lated the criteria which should govern the determination that an adult
is incapable of making health care decisions.l7s Because courts are now
168. The fact of a patient's detention should not be used to determine capacity
since involuntary confinement statutes present standards to determine the need for
hospitalized care and treatment, factors which may be unrelated to a patient's
general ability to consent to treatment. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hygiene I..:J.w § 35.oI
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
169. E.g., N.Y. Mental Hygiene I..:J.w § 78.01 (McKinney Supp. 1973). Cl note 168
supra.
170. E.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 455 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). See notes 190·334 infra
and accompanying text for a discnssion of the authority of a parent or the sute to
consent to treatments for a child.
171. 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.5.2d 97 (1968), rev'g 29 App. Dh·. 2d
538, 285 N.Y.5.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1967).
172. New York courts are empowered to appoint a committee which acts under
judicial supervision to maintain the incompetent's property and other affairs. See
N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 78.01 et seq. (McKinney 1972).
173. 23 N.Y.2d at 388, 244 N.E.2d 678, 297 N.Y.5.2d 99. The patient had switched
herself from an "involuntarily" hospitalized status to a "voluntary" patient. rd.
174. Id.
175. N.Y. Laws [1927], ch.426, § 7, as amended, N.Y. Mental H)-giene I..:J.w §§ 31.13
to 31.25 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
176. 23 N.Y.2d at 393, 244 N.E.2d at 681, 297 N.Y.5.2d at 103.
177. Id. at 394, 244 N.E.2d at 682, 297 N.Y.5.2d at 104.
178. See Matter of Long Island Jewish.Hillside Medical Center, 73 Mise. 2d 395,
342 N.Y.5.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1973), where the court had to determine if a hospital could
operate on a severely debilitated elderly patient who had intermittently opposed the
procedure. The court held he was unable to make health judgments, but its reasoning
was unclear. The only "rule" to be drawn from the case is tllat :Igcd adults with
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confronted with the issue of an adult's ability to decide health care
matters,179 the author suggests that courts would benefit from the con·
sistent application of the following test, derived from the decisions in
Canterbury v. Spence}8o Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental
Health,181 and New York Health and Hospitals Corp. v. Stein.182 An in·
dividual should be considered competent to consent to or refuse treatment
if he can understand the information which a physician is under a legal
duty to impart to him concerning the risks, benefits, and alternatives to
a proposed treatment. Moreover, a rebuttable presumption of competence
should be utilized in every case. Expert testimony should be admissible
to explain the condition of the patient, the nature of the proposed
therapy, and the magnitude of risks involved, but such testimony should
not be conclusive on the competency issue, since the decision to undergo
treatment is a non-medical judgment.183 Relevant topics of inquiry on
the question of competency should include the patient's intelligence,184
emotional state, ability to handle personal affairs, and the reasons prof.
erred for acceptance or refusal of treatment. Furthermore, as Kaimowitz
demonstrates, certain circumstances (such as lengthy institutionalization)
may diminish an individual's capacity and thus necessitate inquiry into a
patient's history. Determinations of incompetency as to health matters
should be based upon a preponderance of the evidence that the patient
is incapable of comprehending the information given to him by his
physician. A court should be able to impose its own judgment of what
is best for the patient only when the patient has been expressly adjudi-
cated incapable of making his or her own health care decisions.18G Where
a court finally concludes that an individual is incompetent to consent to
or refuse treatment, the court should either make the medical decision
itself, on the basis of the evidence it needs to ascertain incapacity, or
should delegate the authority to a guardian180 acting under close judicial
supervision. As Kaimowitz indicated, the kind of consent required varies
with the procedure to be undertaken.187 Where surgical, major medical,
arteriosclerosis who voluntarily enter hospitals, who need life saving operations and
who do not vehemently oppose such operations at all times, may be deemed incom·
petent to refuse treatment.
179. See HEW Report, supra note 84, at 3.
180. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
181. Civ. No. 73·19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), 42 U.S.L.W. 2063.
182. 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
183. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785.
184. Cf. Kaimowitz, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 25.
185. See Harper & James, note 53 supra.
186. Cf. In re Buttenow, 23 N.Y.2d 386, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968),
discussed at notes 171-77 supra and accompanying text. The choice of guardians is
thus crucial; courts should select individuals on the basis of their demonstrated intent
and ability to protect the rights and interests of the patient.
187. Kaimowitz, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, at 22. See note 126 supra.
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electroshock, radiation, or experimental treatments are proposed, only
the court should have the power to authorize the treatment.ISS Finally,
a finding of incapacity to consent to or refuse treatment should not be
considered presumptive of general civil incapacity. mental illness, or the
need forinvoluntary care.IS9 Each of these issues is a distinct question which
should be adjudicated by careful consideration of its own applicable
standards.
MINORS' CAPACITY TO CONSENT TO HEALTH CARE
Introduction.-In most states, unless an "emergency" existed or the
child was emancipated, physicians traditionally had a legal obligation to
obtain the consent of the parents or the person standing in loco parentis
before examining or treating a minor.l90 Minors' own capacity to con-
sent, however, has been recognized for certain medical procedures,lOl
as restrictive state laws requiring parental consentlO:l have been abrogated
and the scope of emergency situations has been broadened by legis-
latures.193 Distinct similarities exist between the provisions of some "med-
ical consent" statutesl94 and the common law rule of emancipation,lOll
188. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 15.03(B)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
See N.Y. Dep't Mental Hygiene, Draft Regulations, Part 27, Quality of Care and
Treatment, § 27.2 (1973).
189. Cf. notes 168 8: 169 supra and accompan}ing te.XL
190. The reason for this is that ph}'Sicians and hospitals fear liability fot battery.
See Stern, Medical Treatment and the Teenager: The Need for Parental Consent,
7 Clearinghouse Rev. 1 (May 1973) [hereinafter cited as Clearinghouse]. For a thorough
discussion of this topic see Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 Alban)' 1.. RC\·.
462 (1972). But see Comment, Medical Care and the Independent Minor, 10 Santa
Clara Law. 334 n.3 (Spring 1970), for a collection of cases demonstrating the courts'
confusion regarding the necessity fur parental consent. One commentator stated that
she had
found no reported cases holding a ph}'Sician civilly liable for furnishing medical
services without parental consent where the minor was O\'cr the age of 15 and
the treatment was rendered with the minor's consent and was for the minor's
benefit.
Zuckerman, Abortion and the Constitutional Rights of Minors, A.C.L.U. Reports 4 n.2
(July 1973).
191. Medical procedures usually excepted include diagnosis and treatment of
venereal diseases (see, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.65.100(a) (1972); Ariz. Re\·. Stat. Ann.
§ 44-132.01 (Supp. 1973», donation of blood (see, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 599.6 (Supp.
1973) (18 years or older», and treatment of drug related probletns (see Clearinghouse,
supra note 190, at 2 n.9 for collection of statutes permitting treatment of minors for
addiction and related probletns).
192. The requirement of parental consent may be imposed implicitly or explicitly,
but often is mandated by means of statutes defining the age of majority. Clearinghouse,
supra note 190, at 1 n.2. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 990.01(20) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (age of
majority is 18 years old); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1.1 (Supp. 1973) (age of majority is 19).
193. See, e.g., FIa. Stat. Ann. § 458.21 (Supp. 1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. cl1. 91, § 18.3
(Smith-Hurd 1973); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 10104 (Supp. 1973).
194. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2504(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973) r'Any
person who is eighteen years of age or older, or is the parent of a cl1ild or has married,
may give effective consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services for himself
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each including such indices as marriage, judicial decree, act of parent or
enlistment in the military service.100 In a growing number of states, courts
have gone even further and gradually have transformed the rule of the
"emancipated minor" into the rule of the "mature minor"107 by refusing
in many situations to rigidly apply these technical requirements for
emancipation.10B Certain statutes provide that a minor will be deemed
"mature" and able to give valid consent to medical treatment where the
procedure is for the benefit of the minor and he can understand its
nature and consequences.100 Although commentators have applauded
such legislative innovations, they note that the difficulty in determining
the "legal maturity" of minor patients and the inability of physicians
to hold them liable for their debts may serve as continuing impediments
to the flow of medical services to minors.200
Beyond the inherent difficulties involved in construing "medical
consent" statutes, oth,~ problems arise from the 'widespread failure of
courts and legislatures to delineate adequately either the scope of minors'
rights or the theory upon which the state intervenes on their behalf.201
or herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary."); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 41-2-13 (Supp. 1971).
195. See, e.g., Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972). The concept of
emancipation applies in other contexts beyond consent to medical treatment and is
generally delineated by case law in each state. See, e.g., 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child
§ 86 (1950) and 32 A.L.R.3d 1055 (1970).
196. Some statutes explicitly provide that emancipated minors may consent effec-
tively to medical treatment. Sec, e.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-4409 (1969). Otller statutes
provide that certain circumstances (considerations derived from the case law con·
cerning emancipation) render a minor competent to consent: marriage or marriage
and divorce (see, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 34, § 76 (Cum. Supp. 1971); Cal. Civ. Code § 25.6
(West Supp. 1973»; pregnancy or parenthood (see, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 91, § 18.1
(Smith-Hurd 1973); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1973»; active duty in
the military (see, e.g., CaL Civ. Code § 25.7 (West Supp. 1973».
197. See Pilpel &: Wechsler, Birth Control, Teenagers and tlle Law, 1 Family
Planning Perspective 29, 30 (Spring 1969); Pilpel &: Zuckerman, Abortion and the
Rights of Minors, 23 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 779, 782 (1972).
198. See, e.g., Schumm v. Schumm, 122 N.J. Super. 146, 299 A.2d 423 (Super. Ct.
Ch. 1973); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
199. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-3 (1972): "Any unemancipated minor of
sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate tlle consequences of the proposed
surgical or medical treatment" may effectively consent.
200. See Clearinghouse, supra note 190, at 4; Medical Care and the Independent
Minor, supra note 190, at 344-45.
201. See, e.g., Matter of Comm'r of Social Servo on behalf of Michael D. v. Bette D.,
72 Mise. 2d 428, 339 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Family Ct. 1972) which raises but never answers this
question:
Is the consent to surgery by a parent or otller person standing in loco parentis
to the child necessary only because the child, by virtue of his infancy lacks the
capacity to consent or is consent necessary because tlle parent has a property
interest in the body of his child?
Id. at 430, 339 N.Y.s.2d at 91. The concept of a "proprietary" interest in children is
highlighted in cases where parents consent to surgical invasion of one child's body
for the purpose of donating an internal organ to another person. This topic, however,
is beyond the scope of this article. See 35 A.L.R.3d 692 (1971); Curran, A Problem
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When the issue of a minor's need for health services emerges and no
statutory provision infuses the child with decision-making power. courts
must adjudicate complex questions regarding the priority of authority to
consent to or refuse treatment. Conflicts have surfaced in litigation in two
basic forms. One recent group of cases raises the issue of the state's role
as arbiter when disagreements between a parent and a child arise over
the advisability of the child's abortion. There is also another category
of actions wherein the courts have sought to define the state's role vis
a vis the parents as the guardian of the child's best interests when non-
emergency medical treatments have been recommended.
Authority to Consent-When Parent and Child Disagree.-Abortion
cases have provided a vehicle for examination of broad medical consent
statutes which have been construed to allow female minors to obtain
and refuse this medical treatment in derogation of parental wishes. Aside
from local statutory decisions,202 certain cases have arisen as a result of
unanswered questions contained in United States Supreme Court rulings.
In particular, Roe v. Wade203 signalled the possibility of a constitutional
right to abortion,204 and now has necessitated analysis of the constitu-
tional effect of the incidents of minority.205
While it is difficult to determine whether the opinions highlighted
below are indicative of judicial (particularly trial court) tendencies with
respect to the general issue of minors' capacity to consent to health care,200
these cases are significant because very few parent-child disputes reach
the adjudicative stages. The cases examined suggest that one approach
to facilitate courts' determination of the minor's ability to understand
the proceedings and to give an informed consent is a "totality of cir-
cumstances" test.207 Certain other cases evidence judicial interpretation
of the Supreme Court decisions leading to the conclusion that the abor-
tion decision rests solely 'with the pregnant minor herse1f.2oS
of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 891 (1959). See also
N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1973, at 14, coL 2, which relates an incident in which parents
consented to the removal of life-sustaining breathing tubes from their injured son
so that his kidney could be removed and prepared for transplanting; and N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1973, at 3, col. 4, reporting a state appeals court ruling mat a Louisiana law
which prevents a minor from donating private property had stopped a ICtarded teen·
ager from giving one of his kidneys to an ailing sister despite parental consent.
202. See Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1971); In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972).
203. 410 U.s. 113 (1973).
204. See note 6 supra.
205. See Coe v. Gerstein, Civ. No. 72·1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1973). discussed at
notes 257·70 infra and accompanying text.
206. The difficulty actually stems from the inevitably controversial and unique
nature of the abortion decision.
207. See Matter of P.]., 12 Cr. L Rptr. 2549 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1973), dis·
cussed at notes 247-49 infra and accompanying text. See also People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d
365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), and cases cited at note 250 infra.
208. See Coe v. Gerstein, Civ. No. 72-1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13. 1973).
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Some states have elected to deal with this consent problem statutorily.
At least fourteen states now provide that minors may consent to medical
and surgical treatment related to pregnancy.20D Two of these states, how-
ever, Hawaii and Missouri, specifically exclude abortion as a type of
"pregnancy-related treatment" covered by their statutes.210 Virginia has
specific provisions in its therapeutic abortion statute requiring parental
consent for unmarried minors and spousal approval for married
minors.211
Although eleven states have left for judicial determination the
question of whether pregnancy-related treatment includes abortion, only
California and Maryland have resolved the issue.212 In the 1971 case
Ballard v. Anderson,213 the California courts reviewed the refusal of a
therapeutic abortion committee to consider the application of a twenty
year-old, unmarried, indigent minor living at home, for the sole reason
that she had not obtained parental consent. The Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia vacated the decision of the court of appeals and specifically held
that the California medical treatment statute214 emancipated unmarried,
pregnant minors for the purpose of obtaining therapeutic abortions
without parental consent.215 In so holding, the court essentially inter-
preted a consent statute, passed fourteen years before California's thera-
peutic abortion act, as giving minors the power to consent to a broader
class of medical procedures than was legally permissible at the time of
that statute's enactment. Since Ballard, the United States Supreme Court's
209. Ala. Code tit. 22, §§ 104(15) to 104(22) (Supp. 1971); Cal. Civ. Code § 84.5
(West 1954); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 708 (Supp. 1970); Ga. Code Ann. § 88·2904
(Supp. 1972); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 577A-l to 577A-2 (Supp. 1972); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-123 (Supp. 1972); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.185 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code
art. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.343 (Supp. 1978); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 41-41-3 (1972); Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 431.061 to 431.063 (Supp. 1973); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:17A-l (Supp. 1973); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 10103 (Supp. 1973); Va. Code
Ann. § 32-137 (Supp. 1973). For a comprehensive table of state legislation relating
to treatment of minors as of September, 1971, see Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical
Care, 36 Albany L. Rev. 462, 472 (1972).
210. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 577A·l (Supp. 1972); Mo. Stat. Ann. § 431.061(1) (Supp.
1973).
211. Va. Code Ann. § l8.I.62.l(e) (Supp. 1973) (parental consent required for
women under 18 and for any woman deemed an infant or incompetent by a court
of competent jurisdiction). The validity of this provision may be in doubt, 11owevcr.
See Coe v. Gerstein, Civ. No. 72·1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1973) (discussed at notes
257·70 infra and accompanying text) striking down a similar Florida statute.
212. See notes 213·16 infra (California) and 218·34 infra (Maryland) and accom·
panying text.
213. 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. I (1971).
214. Cal. Civ. Code § 34.5 (West 1954), which provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, an unmarried pregnant minor
may give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical and surgical care related
to her pregnancy, and such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because
of minority.
215. 4 Cal. 3d at 884, 484 P.2d at 1353, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
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decision in Roe v. Wade216 has expanded the class of legal abortions
even further by validating only those state regulations designed to protect
either the fetus at the point of viability or maternal health at the end of
the first trimester.217 In view of the Ballard court's reasoning that minors
possess discretion which encompasses the right to obtain a legal abortion,
Roe v. Wade may well have enlarged the dimensions of minority emanci-
pation in California.
In 1972, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals went one step be-
yond Ballard when it interpreted Maryland's minority consent statute
in In re Smith.218 Cindy Lou Smith, si.xteen years of age, unmarried,
unemancipated and two months pregnant, appealed a juvenile court
order which had been issued pursuant to her mother's petition and which
had directed her to submit to medical procedures possibly leading to an
abortion.219 Affirming that Cindy was a "child in need of supervision,"2:!O
the appellate court nevertheless reversed the lower court's order requiring
the examinations related to her pregnancy.2:!l
Since the status of unemancipated minors was governed generally by
common law doctrine which dictated that legally enforceable actions re-
quired parental consent, any contrary principles granting minors new
rights and independence needed to be e.xpressly provided by statute.2:!2
In Smith, however, the real question facing the court was not the neces-
sity of parental consent, but rather the ability of a minor to act in deroga-
tion of her parent's will.223
Acknowledging that the right to abortions was purely statutorypt
216. 410 U.s. 113 (1973).
217. Id. at 163-64.
218. 16 Md. App. 209, 215, 295 A.2d 238, 241 (1972).
219. The state's statute permits abortions only under specified conditions, ro
the court merely had the power to order Cindy to be e.x:unined to see if she qualified
for the treatment. See note 224 infra.
220. Id. at 215, 295 A.2d at 241.
221. Id. at 226, 295 A.2d at 246.
222. See Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(a) (Supp. 1973), which provides:
(a) A minor shall have the same capacity to consent to medical treatment as an
adult if one or more of the follOWing apply: (1) The minor has attained the age
of eighteen (18) years. (2) The minor is married or the parent of a child. (3) The
minor seeks treatment or advice concerning venereal disease, "pregnancy" or
contraception not amounting to sterilization. (4) In the judgment of a phpician
treating a minor, the obtaining of consent of any other person would result in
such delay of treatment as would adversely affect the life or health of the minor.
(5) The minor seeks treatment or advice concerning any form of drug abuse as
defined in § 2(d) of Article 43B of the Annotated Code •••• (Emphasis added.)
223. 16 Md. App. at --> 295 A.2d at 245.
224. See Id. at --> 295 A.2d at 244-45. This case was decided before Roe ".
Wade. See Md. Ann. Code art. 43, §§ 137 to 139 (1971), which enumerate the linlited
circumstances under which an abortion is available. In fact, it was unclear whether
Cindy even could have legitimately obtained an abortion. 16 Md. App. at ---' 295 A.2d
at 246.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1973 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 114 1973-1974
114 1973/1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
the court reviewed the Maryland Code abortion provisions, Article 43,
sections 137 to 139, which provided in particular in section 138 that no
person could be forced to submit to an abortion.22G By defining the phrase
"treatment ... concerning ... pregnancy" in Maryland's minors' consent
statut&26 to include abortions, the court granted minors the author-
ity of adults for these purposes. This theory thus placed minors within
the category of "person(s)" described in section 138 of the abortion
statute.221 The court's finding that the legislative intent was to permit
minors to override their parents' wishes has been the subject of some
comment.228 If the philosophy behind the enactment had been "to en-
courage children not to have unplanned families," as the lower court
had indicated,229 Cindy's capacity to oppose her parents would not have
been within legislative contemplation. Thus the court could have de-
cided that the order for an abortion examination would have been ap-
propriate. The appellate court, however, held that the legislature's
design was to emancipate the minor with respect to any medical care
encompassed by the statute as construed by the court, and therefore
Cindy's decision was correctly controlling.230
Illustrative of the theoretical difficulties in these cases are the con-
trasting approaches to the problem adopted by the Smith trial and ap-
pellate courts, which each addressed itself to different fundamental issues.
The lower court emphasized the practical hardships which would face Cin-
dy, her parents and the unborn child.231 The appellate court instead con-
cerned itself with the issue of who should have the power to consent to,
or refuse, the medical treatment.232 While this Maryland decision may
augur well for the rights of minors to consent to abortions in the other
nine states similarly situated,233 such a forecast may be a little optimistic
because the Maryland statute234 is exemplary in its extension of minors'
rights.
225. Md. Ann. Code art. 43, §§ 138(a) and 138(c) (1971).
226. Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(a)(3) (Supp. 1973). See note 222 supra.
227. 16 Md. App. at 225, 295 A.2d at 246. See note 225 supra and accompanying
text.
228. See 7 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1157, 1162·63 (1973).
229. 16 Md. App. at 217, 295 A.2d at 242.
230. Id. at 225, 295 A.2d at 246.
231. Id. at --' 295 A.2d at 244. The trial judge noted the hardship a baby
was likely to impose on a social agency or the grandparents since the young parents
were bound to have financial and other problems.
232. See id. at __, 295 A.2d at 245-46. For recently promulgated federal guide-
lines dealing with sterilization procedures for persons under 21 and legally Incapable
of consenting, see Proposed H.E.W. Reg. § 50.301·305, 38 Fed. Reg. 26460 (Sept. 21,
1973).
233. See notes 209·12 supra and accompanying text.
234. Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(a) (Supp. 1973). See also American Academy of
Pediatrics, Committee on Youth, A Model Act PrOViding for Consent of Minors for
Health Services, 24 Juvenile Justice 60 (1973).
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Smith and Ballard thus demonstrate a technique in statutory con-
struction. To protect minors' ability to control the procedures to which
their bodies would be subject, these courts construed the provisions re-
lating to pregnancy in the relevant medical consent statutes as authoriz-
ing female minors to consent to their own abortions. In each of these
cases, the scope of this authority was governed by the parameters of legal
abortions as set out in the corresponding state therapeutic abortion
statute. This technique now may be employed on a broader scale since the
Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade23G and Doe v. Bolton231J consti-
tute a nation-wide and constitutionally-founded expansion of the category
of legal abortions.237 At the very least, the Ballard/Smith reasoning now
will apply in any state ·with a medical consent statute which the courts
have interpreted as granting minors authority over treatments associated
with pregnancy,238 regardless of that state's pre-e:asting abortion laws.
There may also be a constitutional basis for the principle that minors
have the right to consent to (or refuse) abortions even in states without
specific medical consent statutes. While the Court specifically refused to
consider the validity of statutes requiring parental or paternal consent,Zl:J
Justice Blackmun located a right of privacy in the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty.2(O The Court held that a state had
the power to impinge upon the woman's fundamental right to control
what is done to her body only when the state's interest was sufficiently
compelling and regulations of the procedures were narrowly drawn.2U
The only state interests deemed adequately compelling were the pregnant·
woman's health at the end of the first trimester and pre-natal life at the
end of the second trimester. Therefore, unless the mere status of minority
serves to limit a woman's fourteenth amendment rights, or the state is
found to have some other compelling interest satisfied by granting the
parents authority superior to that of the pregnant minor to decide
235. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
236. 410 u.s. 179 (1973).
237. Roe prohibited all state regulation of abortion during the fIrSt trimester.
410 U.s. at 163. See also text accompanying notes 216 &: 217 supra.
238. See statutes cited in note 209 supra. QUery whether the medical consent
statutes in Hawaii and Missouri (see note 210 supra) are still valid.
239. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.s. at 165 D.67.
240. Id. at 152-53.
241. Id. at 162-63. See generally Developments in the Law-EqUal Protection, 82
Harv. L Rev. 1065 (1969). Essentially the doctrine provides that statutory classifica-
tions which differentiate between groups of people otherwise similarly sitU3ted by
reliance upon "suspect" criteria (e.g., race, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.s.
214, 216 (1964» or by affecting a group of pexsons' "fundamental interests" (e.g••
procreation. see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.s. 535, 541 (1942» will be held un-
constitutional as a denial of equal protection unless justified by a "compelling" state
interest.
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whether she should bear a child, any state regulation beyond that ap-
proved in Roe should be held unconstitutiona1.242
The principle that minors are fuU-fledged citizens within the mean-
ing of the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights was affirmed by
the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gattlt.243 In addition, there are a
variety of other situations in which the Court has extended basic con-
stitutional guarantees to minors.244
The Supreme Court, however, has never directly confronted the
issue of a minor's rights vis a vis his parents where the two conilict.2411
This dearth of case law is due at least in part, to an express or implied
unity of interest between the parent and child. Recently, however, the
validity of this theoretical merger of interests has been disputed in sev-
eral contexts.246
One lower court case, Matter of P.J.,247 clearly acknowledged that
the mere status of minority should not render a person incompetent to
make an abortion decision. The court ruled that a seventeen year-old be
permitted to have an abortion despite the objections of her mother, who
had cared for her daughter's first child. The court not only looked to the
pregnant minor's own ability to give an informed consent, but also noted
the disparity between her religious beliefs and those of her parents:
[IJhe court has found that although a juvenile, and despite her age, Re-
spondent's statuS was one of quasi.emancipation; her degree of maturity
and knowledge was such that she fully understood the nature of the opera-
tion, how the operation is performed, and effects of such an operation: and
that having an abortion does not violate any of her religious beliefs, which
are distinguished from those of her parents.248
242. See Coe v. Gerstein, Civ. No. 72·1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1973), discussed at
notes 257-70 infra and accompanying text.
243. 387 U.S. 1 (1969). The Gault court specifically rejected the idea that any
alleged societal benefits resulting from informal juvenile court procedures constituted
a valid basis for depriving a minor of the right to procedural due process, and stated
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."
Id. at 13.
244. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard to be applied in juvenile court); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.•
393 U.s. 503 (1969) (freedom of speech for students); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory pledge of allegiance declared unconstitutional).
245. For a forceful argument in support of the theory that a child should be the
constitutional equal of an adult, see Kaimowitz, Legal Emancipation of Minors in
Michigan, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 23 (1972).
246. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J.• dissenting In
part). The majority held they did not need to reach the issue of a possible confllct
between parent and child. Id. at 231. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't.
397 U.S. 728, 730 n.l (1970).
247. 12 Cr. L. Rptr. 2549 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1973).
248. Id.
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The court's emphasis on a totality of factors, rather than age alone,24D
was an adaptation of a recognized approach for determining a given
minor's maturity and his or her competence to be treated as an adult.
This method traditionally has been used in cases concerning the effective-
ness of waivers of minors' constitutional rights.2GO There is therefore a
suggestion that some courts have afforded broad constitutional protec-
tions to minors; in the proper instances courts will not permit parental
waiver of minor's rights "I\Tithout a factual determination that the child
is incompetent to rationally comprehend the situation. Thus, under this
line of authority, if a mature minor is competent to waive certain con-
stitutional rights, logically he must possess the capacity necessary to
assert them.
If it is assumed for the purposes of this analysis that the mere status
of minority does not have a detrimental effect on a person's consti-
tutional rights, it follows that a parental consent requirement "I\Till p:lSS
constitutional muster only if it serves a compelling state interest. The
t"IV'O justifications most frequently advanced are the need to protect the
minor from her own improvidence and the importance of preserving the
family unit by sustaining the primacy of parental contro1.2G1
The first justification is immediately suspect in any state where the
legislature has lowered or abolished the age of consent for any medical
treatments since these states theoretically have conceded already that
minors are capable of making informed decisions regarding their O"l'ffi
health. Moreover, if a woman is pregnant it is too late to "save" her
from improvident sexual activity. To deny her a desired abortion is to
suggest that she is not mature enough to make that decision, but is mature
enough to give birth to, and care for, a child.2G2
Finally even assuming that the state's interest in protecting minors
249. See Stem, Furnishing Information and MediClI Treatment 10 Minors for
Protection, Termination and Treatment of Pregnancy, 5 Clearinghouse Rev. 131, 153
OUly 1971).
250. See, e.g., People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1967), declaring that the validity of a minor's confession made without the presence
of counselor other responsible adult "depcnd[ed] not on his age alonc, but on a
combination of that factor with other circumstances such as his inlelligence, eduCltion.
and ability to comprehend the meaning and the effect of his stalement." Id. at 383,
432 P.2d at 215, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 599. See also McBride \'. Jacobs. 2·17 F.2d 595 (D.c.
Cir. 1957); Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956). holding
that parental waiver of a minor's rights will be effcctive only wherc the minor is
incapable of making a waiver and the interests of parent and child arc not adn:rse.
251. Pilpel and Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors. 23 Case W. Res.
L Rev. 779, 799-800 (1972).
252. In addition there is the possibility that denied a mediClJly safe. Ic:gal abor-
tion, a young woman would seek the services of an illegal and unsafe abortionist
rather than consult her parents.
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from their own improvidence is deemed compelling, the state cannot
sustain a restriction on constitutionally protected activity unless the
government has chosen a relatively unburdensome mode of furthering
that interest.253 Any consent statute isolating all women below a certain
age sweeps too broadly because it fails to take into account the truly
relevant factors-the emotional maturity and intellectual capacity of
a female minor-of giving an informed consent.254 Anyway, a statutory
presumption that age has its correlate in maturity is not only factually
incorrect, but under recent Supreme Court decisions would raise serious
due process questions.255
The second justification offered might be that requiring parental
consent fosters parental control and thereby sustains the family unit.
Referring once again to numerous medical consent statutes, we find legis-
latures often have determined that parental control is of secondary im-
portance where a minor's health is at stake. Furthermore, in many cases,
a minor's pregnancy is a de facto indication of a pre-existing failure of
parental control, which can hardly be remedied by a parental consent
statute. Moreover to assert this justification after the fact and force these
women to bear unwanted children is merely cruel and possibly unconsti.
tutional punishment of unlucky girls for illicit intercourse.256
Portions of the constitutional analysis stemming from Roe v. Wade
were employed recently by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in Coe v. Gerstein.251 The court struck down
Florida's "spousal and parental consent" requirement258 on behalf of two
253. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J.).
254. But see note 199 supra and accompanying text. See also Stern, supra note
249, at 152 n.14.
255. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 u.s. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 u.S. 645
(1972); Bell v. Burson. 402 u.s. 535 (1971); Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care.
36 Albany L. Rev. 462, 464 (1972).
256. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 u.S. 438 (1972), rejecting the argument that
the Massachusetts birth control statute which prohibited the prescription of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons aided enforcement of its anti-fornication statute. Cf.
State v. Baird, 50 N.J. 376, 383, 235 A.2d 673, 677 (1967), where Chief Judge Weintraub.
concurring, stated that "to prescribe ••• [an unwanted pregnancy] • • . as a punish-
ment for illicit intercourse would be a monstrous thing." But see Doe v. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Utah, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75 (1973), upholding a statute
which prohibited minors from obtaining contraceptive services without parental
consent:.
257. Civ. No. 72-1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1973).
258. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.22(3) (Supp. 1973):
One of the following shall be obtained by the physician prior to terminating a
pregnancy:
(a) The written request of the pregnant woman and, if she is married, the
written consent of her husband, unless the husband is voluntarily living apart
from the wife, or
(b) If the pregnant woman is under eighteen years of age and unmarried, in
addition to her written request, the written consent of a parent, custodian or
legal guardian must be obtained, or
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females each pregnant for less than three months. One of the plaintiffs,
Patricia Noe, was an unmarried minor unable to obtain parental consent
for a therapeutic abortion.2S9
The court noted at the outset that Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
dealt specifically with the state's interest in the protection of maternal and
fetal health and did not address the interests of third parties, such as the
father or husband and the parents.2CO The court reasoned that the state
was proscribed from imposing any regulations (even those made on behalf
of the fetus' father or grandparents) which had as their purposes the
interests enumerated in Roe, except at times and in manners therein pro-
vided..261 However, if Florida had demonstrated that the third party
interests, which were to be protected by its statute, attached at the time of
conception and fell completely outside the categories of protection of
maternal health and potential life, the court would have conceded that
Roe was not controlling.2c2
The court recognized that the interest of the husband or parent in
the pregnant wife or daughter and the fetus which she carries is qualita-
tively different from the interest which the state may constitutionally
assert.263 Nevertheless, even if such compelling parental and paternal
interests existed from the moment of conception, the court held that the
statute was fatally defective:
... [I]t is apparent that not all paternal or parental interests full outside
the categories of protection of maternal health and potential liCe. ••• TIle
failure of the Florida "spousal or parental consent requirement" is that it
gives to husbands and parents the authority to withhold consent for abor-
tions for any reason or no reason at all.264
The court concluded that since the state cannot interfere with a woman's
right of privacy in the first trimester to protect her health, or before via-
bility to protect the fetus, it cannot delegate to third parties an authority
it does not possesS.265
Although the decision reaches an admirable result and is in keeping
with recent trends in the area of juvenile rights, its reasoning may be
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, a phpici:m
may terminate a pregnancy provided he has obtained at least one corroborati\'e
medical opinion attesting to the medical necessity for emergency medical pro-
cedures and to the fact that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the con·
tinuation of the pregnancy would threaten the life of the pregnant woman.
259. Civ. No. 72-1842, at 2. The other plaintiffs werc SC\'eral phpicians practicing
family medicine and Nancy Coe, a pregnant married \l'oman unable to obtain her
husband's consent to an abortion. Id.
260. Id. at 3 8: n.4.
261. Ill. at 4.
262. Ill.
263. Ill. at 4-5.
264. Id. at 5.
265. Id. at 6.
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vulnerable to some critical comment. The court, for instance, stated
categorically that "a pregnant woman under 18 years of age cannot, under
the law, be distinguished from one over 18 years of age in reference to
'fundamental,' 'personal' constitutional rights,"266 but failed to consider
that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Roe might lead to a broader right
for minors than adults. For instance, application of the Roe concept of
"trimester" time periods might be inappropriate for minors. For an older
woman, the dangers of carrying a baby to term may be greater than
having an abortion within the first trimester. Since the dangers of preg-
nancy and childbirth increase as age decreases to a certain point,267 abor-
tion might be a comparatively safer procedure for young minors even
beyond the parameters of the first trimester.
An interest mentioned by the court which admits of unique applica.
tion to minors is that of the preservation and primacy of the family
unit. Although reasons previously mentioned268 indicate the shortcomings
of this approach, the court does little more than imply that this justifica.
tion may be insufficient to sustain the statute merely because it is reason-
ably related to protection of maternal health and potential life. The
court's opinion, therefore, could have been strengthened had it distin-
guished the state's interest in regulating the abortions of minors from
that in regulating adults.
A thorough analysis of permissible third party interests would entail
a consideration of those private interests whose existence is not dependent
upon a grant of authority from the state,260 as well as those which the
state may create through a delegation of its power. The court does not
address the enforceability of this first class of interests, probably because
its scrutiny is focused on the Florida statute. With respect to the latter
class, the court seems to recognize the possibility of state regulation which
would allow consent to be withheld within the first trimester for reasons
other than protection of maternal health and potential life, if the existence
of such reasons could be demonstrated. Although this might seem to open
the door for amended regulations, the difficulties presented by such an
alternative are well documented in a footnote by the court:
Because of the practical problems involved in drafting or enforcing a statute
which would exclude interests related to maternal health in the first trio
mester, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Rehnquist (dissenting) that
266. Id.
267. See Guttmacher, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion, 28 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 756, 768 (1972).
268. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
269. Civ. No. 72-1842, at 6. See text accompanying note 265 supra. Cf. Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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as a practical matter, "a state may impose virtually no restrictions on the
performance of abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy." Roe v.
Wade, 93 S. Ct. at 736.270
Although the court reaches a laudable and timely result while con·
fronting a number of significant and difficult issues, its opinion would have
had even greater ramifications for minors' rights had it more carefully ap-
plied Roe's reasoning and more explicitly responded to the possibility of
third party interests unique to a minor 'Woman.
Authority to Consent-When Parent and State Disagree.-The
juvenile courts, the primary forum for the determination of minors'
rights, traditionally possessed only weak common law bases upon which
to rest their jurisdiction when they sought to order medical treatment for
infants over parental objections.271 In an effort to alleviate this problem,
states have enacted civil statutes, based on their police power, granting
the courts authority to deprive a parent of custody where an infant is
found to be "neglected," "dependent," or in need of "'necessaries.":!1:l
Thus, the question of a state's privilege to order corrective or preventative
non-emergency medical care for infant citizens has become largely one of
statutory interpretation.273
270. Civ. No. 72-1842, at 6 n.6.
271. Courts have used the theories of parens patriae (see, e.g., Johnson v. Sl:lte,
18 N.J. 422, 430-31, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the
Free Exercise of Religion, 42 Ind. L.J. 386, 390-91 n.30 (1967); 64 Mich. 1.. Rc\·. 554,
555 n.5 (1966», the provision of "necessaries" (see, e.g., Pickering \'. Gunning, Palmer,
528, 81 Eng. Rep. 1204 (1629); Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, Guides to the Judge in Medical Orders Affecting Children, 14 Crime 8:
Delinq. 109-10 (1968); Justice v. State, 116 Ga. 605, 606, 42 S.E. 1013, 1014 (1902)
(holding that necessary sustenance does not include medical care» or an aIlirmati\'e
duty to protect life (see, e.g., Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.s. 978 (1964); United Sl:ltcs
v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Raleigh Firkin·Paul Morgan Mem. Hasp.
v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 u.s. 985 (1964); Hoener
v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (JUv. 8: Dom. ReI. Ct. 1961). See lilio
John F. Kennedy Mem. Hasp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). But see
In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Mise. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962». Some states also had enacted penal
laws to compel parents to prOVide adequate medical care, but these provisions contain
the inherent deficiency that often they were applicable only after irreparable harm
had befallen the child. See People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 60 NoE. 2·13 (1903); Craig
v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 era.
Civ. App. 1947). See generally Note, Court Ordered Non.Emergency Medical Care for
Infants, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 296 (1969); 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 961, 963 (1972).
272. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. 8: Inst'ns Code § 600 (Wcst 1972); Conn. Gen. Sl:lt. Re\'.
§ 17-59 (Supp. 1973); Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 70·10) (Supp. 1973); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 211.031 (1959); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:4-34 (1951); N.D. Cent. Code § 27·20.02 (1960); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.04 (page 1968); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.010(12) (1962).
273. The traditional procedure used for obtaining such medical orders in\"oh'cs
a finding of neglect which arguably stigmatizes parents as unfit to care for their chIld.
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The New York family court jurisdiction was contested in Matter of
Sampson,274 a case involving a fifteen year-old boy, Kevin Sampson, who
was victim of an extensive neurofibromatosis, or Von Recklinghausen's
disease, which manifested itself in the massive deformity of his face and
neck. The Commissioner of Health of Ulster County brought a proceeding
pursuant to Article 10 of the Family Court Act27G charging the child's
mother, Ms. Sampson, with neglect because she had objected to blood
transfusions necessary for safe performance of corrective surgery on the
child.276 The family court held that it possessed the jurisdictional (both
statutory277 and constitutional278) authority to protect the child's welfare
by ordering the blood transfusions,27o despite Ms. Sampson's religious280
and medical281 objections and the physicians' counsel that surgical risk
would decrease with age.282 The court based its conclusion on the serious
psychological impairment which might result from such conspicuous
Santos v. Goldstein, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450, motion for leave to appeal
dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 672, 185 N.E.2d 904, 233 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1962), emphasized that
a mere court order for medical treatment did not indicate the parents were unfit
or had neglected their child in the traditional sense. Accord, Matter of Sampson, 65
Misc. 2d 658, 676, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 658 (Family Ct. 1970), alI'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668,
323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d
686 (1972). See notes 274-303 infra and accompanying text. One proposal recommends
that such statutes provide for emergency medical procedure entirely divorced from
any concept of "neglect." Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delin·
quency, Guides to the Judge in Medical Orders Affecting Children, 14 Crime &:
Delinq. 109, 117 (1968).
274. 65 Mise. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.s.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970), alI'd, 37 App. Div. 2d
668, 323 N.Y.s.2d 253 (1971), alI'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328
N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
275. See note 277 infra.
276. 65 Mise. 2d at 658, 661, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 643, 645.
277. Id. at 663·64, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 647·48. See N.Y. Canst. art. 6, § 13(b): N.Y.
Family Ct. Act §§ 115, 115(b), 232(a), 232(b), 232(c), lOll, 1012, 1013 (McKinney Supp.
1973).
278. 65 Mise. 2d at 665·69, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 649·52. See U.s. Canst. amend. I: N.Y.
Const. art. I, § 3.
279. 65 Mise. 2d at 671, 676, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 654, 658. The court believed the
state had a paramount duty to insure Kevin's "right to live and grow up without
disfigurement." Id. at 669, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
280. Jehovah's Witnesses hold as a cardinal principle of their faith that the law
of God explicitly forbids the eating or ingestion of blood into the body by any means
whatever, including modern surgical procedures for the transfusion of blood. Watcll-
tower Bible and Tract Society, Blood, Medicine and the Law of God (1961); State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cited in 65 Misc. 2d at 662, 317 N.Y.S.2d
at 646.
281. The court identified several potential complications: mismatching of in·
compatible blood types; circulatory overload or air embolism caused by inept pro-
cedures; transmission of diseases such as syphillis, malaria and hepatitis from blood
obtained through commercial blood banks. 65 Mise. 2d at 662, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
282. The bigger one grows physically, the smaller the blood loss will be propor·
tional to the total blood supply. Id. at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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deformity,283 and, indeed, had already been reflected in Kevin's "low
self concept."284
Initially addressing itself to Ms. Sampson's religious objections, the
court contrasted the absolute right to believe as one chooses, with the
limited right to act on those beliefs where the public health or welfare is
concerned.28li The cases cited in the decision, however, represented only
debatable precedent for the court's thesis that the state's power to order
blood transfusions overrides religious objections since the earlier cases
had specifically involved life-saving treatments.28G
The court next weighed the potential benefit from such an operation
against the risk involved. Citing Matter of Rotkowitz281 for the proposi-
tion that the child's life need not be endangered to justify judicial inter-
ference, the court found that more than adequate potential benefit existed
to outweigh the inherent hazards of Surgery.288 Here again, however, this
precedent was weak support for the Sampson decision since the operation
in Rotkowitz was far less serious than that in Sampson and other facts
rendered the cases distinguishable. Moreover, the Rotl:owitz court itself
had stretched the holding of the seminal New York opinion, Matter of
Vasko.289 Vasko, unlike either Rotkowitz or Sampson concerned a malady
which if uncorrected, would probably have resulted in death.::Oo
The only other precedent for the New York court was the dissenting
283. Although during the trial, medical testimony indicated no evidence of
thinking disorder, no outstanding personality aberration, and no immediate threat
to his sight or hearing (id. at 659-60,317 N.Y.s.2d at 643-44), Kevin did remain virtually
illiterate because he had been exempted from school since age nine by reason of his
facial disfigurement.
284. Id. at 660, 317 N.Y.s.2d at 644.
285. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.s. 158 (1944): Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
u.s. 296 (1940); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.s. 333 (1890): Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878).
286. See People ex rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 1M N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.s. 824 (1952): Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 u.s. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962): Hoener
v. Bertinato, 67 N.]. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 14 auv. 8: Dom. ReL Ct. 1951): Santos v.
Goldstein, 16 App. Div. 2d 766, 227 N.y.s.2d 450, motion for leave to appeal dismissed,
12 N.Y.2d 672, 185 N.E.2d 904, 233 N.Y.s.2d 465 (1962): In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d
86, 185 N.E.2d 128, 90 Ohio LAbs. 21 (C.P. 1962).
287. 175 Mise. 948, 25 N.Y.s.2d 624 (Dom. RcL Ct. 1941). The RotMwib: court
ordered surgery to stabilize a child's right foot, thereby preventing aggrn\';ltion and
extension of a deformity. The operation, however, '\'ilS not serious, the child's mother
favored the treatment and the father's objections were not religious. Id. at 931, 25
N.Y.s.2d at 627.
288. 65 Mise. 2d at 669·70, 674-75, 317 N.Y.s.2d at 653·54, 657·58.
289. 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.s. 552 (1933).
290. The child suffered from a malignant growth of the e}'Co Id. at 130·31, 263
N.Y.s. at 555.
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opinion by Judge Stanley Fuld in Matter of SeiferthJ201 a case in which
the court of appeals reversed a lower court order for corrective surgery.
In attempting to cmtinguish a case closely analogous on its facts, the
Sampson court argued that its powers had been expanded by a new section
of the Family Court Act,202 giving the family court jurisdiction to order
certain care or treatment for physically handicapped children. In addition,
the court reasoned that the legislative intent of a recent revision of Article
10 of the Family Court Act203 conferred upon the court the "broadest
power and discretion" to deal with abused and neglected children.204 The
Sampson court, however, overlooked the fact that the Children's Court
Act, in force when Seiferth was decided, had given that court the un-
disputed power to order "necessary" surgery for neglected children.2011
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Sampson ruling and
endorsed the Family Court's assumption of broad authority and use of
discretion2D6 in rejecting parents' religious objections. Relying upon a
decision201 construing a Washington state statute,2D8 the New York ap-
pellate court followed the trial judge's lead by also ignoring the distinc-
tion between life-saving treatments2DD and the less extreme procedures at
bar or in Rotkowitz.
It is well settled that a person's right to practice religion freely does
not include the liberty to expose the community or his child to commu-
nicable disease.30o Similarly, where a child's life is imperiled by his
parents' refusal to provide medical care, courts uniformly have been
291. 309 N.Y. 80, 86, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955). The court of appeals found
that a congenital hair lip and cleft palate, causing disfigurement, a marked speech
defect and emotional and psychological sensitivity, did not give rise to such an
emergent and serious condition as would threaten the child's life or health.
292. "Whenever a child within the jurisdiction of the court appears to the court
to be in need of medical, surgical, therapeutic, or hospital care or treatment, a
suitable order may be made therefore." N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 232(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1973). The statute had been enacted after the Seilerth decision.
293. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1011-72 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
294. 65 Mise. 2d at 671, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
295. "'[N]eglected child' shall mean a child • • . whose parents, guardian or
custodian neglect and refuse, when able to do so, to provide necessary medical, surgical,
institutional or hospital care for such child." Law of April 10, 1922, ch. 547, § 2(4),
[1922] N.Y. Children's Ct. Act (repealed 1962).
296. Seilerth was held to have "impliedly or expressly recognized the court's power
to direct surgery even in the absence of risk to the physical health or life of the subject
or to the public." 29 N.Y.2d 900, 901, 278 N.E.2d 918, 919, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1972).
297. Jehovah's Witnesses in the State of Washington v. King County Hosp., 278
F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). This court
overruled a Jehovah's Witnesses' objections to a statute which empowered a court
to order medical care for children found "grossly and willfully neglected as to medical
care necessary for well being."
298. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.04.010 (1962), 13.04.095 (Supp. 1972).
299. See 278 F. Supp. at 503 n.lO (blood transfusions).
300. See, e.g., cases cited in note 305 infra.
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willing to order appropriate relief.sol SampsonJ however, represents an
expansion of judicial power which previously had been hinted at almost
exclusively by other New York cases.302 Although the initial response to
the Sampson opinion is one of relief that aid 'will be granted a boy who,
due to a religious tenet embraced by his parents, might have been forced
to endure a massive physical deformity throughout his life, the court's
intervention has other theoretical ramifications. Essentially, it signals an
anomalous return to paternalism or "best interests" adjudication,303 con-
trary to the general trend demonstrated by this article.
In express contrast to the New York approach, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in In re GreenJS04 recently held that a mother's religious
objections to medical treatment for her son whose life was not in imme-
diate danger should prevail over the state's interests in tlle dlild.30G
Ricky Ricardo Green, sixteen years old, was a two-time victim of polio
attacks which had resulted in obesity and 94 per cent curvature of the
spine and prevented him from walking or standing.soo Altllough remedial
surgery had been recommended, Ms. Green, a Jehovah's Witness, had
refused to consent to the treatment because of her religious objections
to the necessary blood transfusions. While the Pennsylvania court ac-
knowledged the Commonwealth's position that the neglect statutes301
301. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses in the State of Washington \'. King County
Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1957), afPd per curiam, 390 U.s. 593 (1958);
Brooklyn Hosp. v. Torres, 45 Mise. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.s.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Malter
of Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.s. 552 (1933); cases cited in In re Green, 448 Pa.
338, ----> 292 A.2d 387, 390 (1972).
302. See, e.g., Matter of Rotkowitz, 175 Mise. 948, 25 N.Y.s.2d 624 (Dom. Rcl Ct.
1941). Cf. In re Karwath, __ Iowa ----> 199 N.W.2d 147 (1972); In the Malter of
the Corom'r of Social Servo on behalf of Michael D. v. Bette D., 72 Mise. 2d 428,
339 N.Y.s.2d 89 (Family Ct. 1972); In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.s.2d 314 (Dam. Rcl Ct.
1952); In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950).
303. See especially 65 Mise. 2d at 675, 317 N.Y.s.2d at 657·58, where the court
explicitly grants all discretion to the surgeons without reser\'ing to the patient or his
representative any power or right of informed consent. Compare, e.g., Canterbury \'.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.c. Cir. 1972), and other cases discussed in Part 1 of this
article supra.
304. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
305. 448 Pa. at -> 292 A.2d at 392. One legitimate state interest e.'tists e\'co
if the child's life is not imperiled if his condition threatens society in a manner
distinct from its effect on him. See cases in\'olving court ordered vaccinations, e.g.,
Zucht v. King, 260 u.s. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. l'tfassachusetts, 197 U.s. 11 (1905);
Mannis v. State, 240 Ark. 42, 398 S.W.2d 206, cert. denied, 384 U.s. 972 (1966); Cude
v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark.
906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); McCartney v. Austin, 57 Mise. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.s.2d 188
(Sup. Ct. 1968), afPd, 31 App. Div. 2d 370, 298 N.Y.5.2d 26 (1969). Sec also Comment,
27 Ark. L. Rev. 151, 153 (1973).
306. 448 Pa. at __, 292 A.2d at 388.
307. A "neglected child" is "[a] child whose parent ••• neglects or re£uses to
provide proper or necessary ..• medical or surgical care" and may be committed "to
the care, guidance and control of some reputable citizen of good moral character • • :'
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could be construed to convey authority to a trial court to order medical
treatment,30S it held in favor of the child's mother because the free
exercise clause of the first amendment300 circumscribed the broad language
of the state law.BIO Ultimately, however, the court remanded the case to
determine Ricky's religious beliefs,3ll and reserved decision with respect
to any possible parent-child conHict.312
The court adopted a test by which to evaluate the state's interest
when it conflicted with a parent's religious views as to the proper care for
a child; the state must show "a substantial threat to society"318 to out-
weigh protections provided to individuals under the first amendment.8H
The court carefully distinguished cases in which the child's life was in
danger,8lG declining to express any view on the results of their balancing
test in such situations.3lG The majority viewed with horror the ramifica-
tions of discarding the fatal-nonfatal distinction as in Sampson. The
Pennsylvania Court feared that to permit wide judicial discretion to make
decisions merely on the basis of whether the treatments were "required"OI7
Pat Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 50-101 et seq. (Supp. 1973). See 448 Pat at __ nn.2 &: 8, 292
A.2d at 388 nn.2 &: 3.
308. 448 Pat at -.. 292 A.2d at 388.
309. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion. • ••"
u.s. Const. amend. I.
310. See 448 Pat at -I 292 A.2d at 388·91.
1m. Id. at __, 292 A.2d at 392. This procedure was consistent with the majority's
view of Justice Douglas' dissent in Wisconsin V. Yoder, 406 U.s. 205, 241 (1972) (sec
note 314 infra) and recent Pennsylvania extensions of the rights of minors in various
contexts. See, e.g., Commonwealth V. Moses, 446 Pat 850, 287 A.2d 131 (1971); Falco v.
Pados, 444 Pat 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); In re Snellgrose, 482 Pat 158, 247 A.2d 596
(1968).
312. 448 Pat at __, 292 A.2d at 392. See In re Green, 452 Pat 378. 307 A.2d 279
(1973), affirming trial court's finding after the evidentiary hearing on remand that
Ricky did not want the surgery because of religious and medical reasons.
313. Id. at -' 292 A.2d at 389, and alluding to Sherbert V. Verner, 374 U.s.
398, 403 (1963). See note 305 supra.
314. See Wisconsin V. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233·34 (1972), where the Supreme
Court held that the free exercise clause barred the application of a compulsory edu-
cation statute to the members of the Amish sect. Sec Comment, II Duquesne L. Rev.
440, 446 (1973), which posited an alternative to the "substantial threat to society"
requirement to justify judicial interference. The court should inquire: (1) Wlll the
state be subjected to additional burdens by refusing to order the operation, and (2)
Are the child's parents aware of all the consequences of not ordering the operation?
315. See 448 Pat at -.. 292 A.2d at 390 and cases cited therein. In particular,
the court distinguished Jehovah's Witnesses in the State of Washington V. King
County Hasp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 1198
(1968), on the ground that the prior case involved the application of a statute where
children's lives were in imminent danger. But sec the Sampson court's usc of King
County Hosp., notes 297-99 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Wisconsin V. Yoder, 406
u.s. 205, 233-34 (1972), which relied upon Application of President &: Directors of
Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), which
involved life-saving treatment for an adult. 448 Pat at __, 292 A.2d at B90.
316. 448 Pat at -t 292 A.2d at 392.
317. See Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d at 671, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
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would cause "endless problems" in interpreting and equitably applying
the rule to later cases.318
Justice Eagen 'wrote a vigorous dissent focusing on the majority's
dichotomous analysis of the interests at stake, and found their opinion
insufficiently solicitous of the health and well-being of Ricky Green.:UG
Rejecting the majority's life or death emphasis as unsupported by tlle
Pennsylvania statute320 or the case law, Eagen noted that the decisions in
both Wisconsin v. Yoder321 and Prince v. Massachusetts,322 each relied
upon by the majority, employed only the word "health."323 Justice
Eagen's final disagreement 'with the majority centered on the infeasibility
and impropriety of asking a dependent child to choose between the chance
for a normal life and his parents' religious beliefs.324
While the logic of this dissent seems forceful and realistic, it fails
to raise several additional available arguments. Eagen never directly
confronted either the majority's central requirement of a "substantial
threat to society" or their application of the standard.32li It could have
been argued that just as the child labor law upheld over religious objec-
tions in Prince326 reflected a societal judgment that child labor in general
was an evil to be avoided, child neglect statutes represent an analogous
determination vis a vis parents' treatment of their children. Both types
of statutes empower the state to act pursuant to its compelling interest
of protecting the health and welfare of children.
Another available rebuttal to the majority'S reasoning could have
focused on their strained use of the Yoder decision.321 Not only did the
court rely upon dictum, ignoring express qualifications where health was
concerned, but it also inadequately e.xplained the Yoder court's failure
to consider the children's views on the issues at bar.328 The Green facts
318. 448 Pa. at -' 292 A.2d at 392.
319. Id. at -' 292 A.2d at 393.
320. See note 307 supra.
321. See note 314 supra.
322. 321 U.s. 158 (1944) (upheld child labor law over religious objections).
323. 448 Pa. at -' 292 A.2d at 394-95.
324. Id. at -' 292 A.2d at 395. See Sampson, 65 Mise. 2d at 672, 317 N.Y.s.2d
at 655, relying on Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 86·87, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955)
(Fuld, J., dissenting). See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, their
Parents and the State, 4- Family LQ. 320 (1970). "A great proportion of the decisions
made by parents for children cannot meet with resistance because the child is too
ignorant and unsophisticated to understand the ramifications of the decision and
question it, or even to realize that legitimate alternatives were open and a decision
was made." Id. at 424.
325. See 41 U. em. L. Rev, 961, 965-66 (1972).
326. See note 322 supra.
327. See 448 Pa. at -' 292 A.2d at 390, and as pointed out in Justice Eagen's
dissent, see notes 314, 321 8: 323 supra and accompanying text..
328. See 448 Pa. at -' 292 A.2d at 392. The Green court argued that it was
the parents who were prosecuted for their religious beliefs in Yoder, whereas "it is
the child rather than the parent in this appeal who is directly im'olvcd:'
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were analytically similar to those in Yoder since each case concerned
parents motivated by religious beliefs who wanted to contradict expressed
public policy in the treatment of their children. The Yoder result was
understandable since long-term compulsory public education might well
have had a significant impact on the religious beliefs of the Amish
children. The likelihood that Ricky's medical care would have affected
his religious beliefs was substantially smaller, however, since undergoing
one surgical procedure does not usually result in changes in a person's
views of society and religion. Therefore, such a rationale hardly supports
his or his parents' deeper involvement in the decision-making process.
In striking contrast to both Green and Sampson, but more in line
with the earlier cases involving parental objections to medical treatment
for their children,829 is Interest of Henry Green,a3o a decision concerning
a six year-old boy who was suffering from sickle cell anemia, an incurable
hereditary blood disease. The Milwaukee County Court, relying upon the
mother's "reasonable" non-religious objections in lieu of her doctrinal
views as a Jehovah's witness, refused to order highly recommended medical
treatment. The court's analysis proceeded on two levels-who has the
right to decide about the child's treatment, and under what limitations.
The court held, inter alia} that parents' exercise of religious freedom was
not superior to the interest of the state as parens patriae in protecting a
child's welfare.331 Nevertheless, the court held that parental discretion
should control where there is doubt as to the "efficacy of the proposed
medical procedures and great danger or risk of death to the child by the
treatment proposed."332 Although there was strong medical evidence at-
testing to the benefit of a blood transfusion, the court dismissed the
neglect petition which had brought on the proceeding, since the mother's
objections were logical, reasonable and made in good faith.aBB Henry
Green represents relatively early judicial recognition that, rather than
329. See, e.g., Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (whlell relied
not upon the father's beliefs, but rather upon the child's resistance to the proposed
treatments because of his indoctrination); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dlst. 561, 562
(phila. County Ct. 1911), noted in 14 Crime &: Delinq. 107, 112 n.12 (1968); Matter of
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). See also In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294,
248 P.2d 553 (1952).
830. 12 Crime &: Delinq. 377 (Child. Div. Milwaukee County Ct. Mar. 18, 1966).
331. 12 Crime &: Delinq. at 382. A degree of parental discretion, however, was found
to exist as a result of the ninth amendment and the jUdiciallY'developing right to
privacy as interpreted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Id.
332. 12 Crime &: Delinq. at 384.
333. Id. at 384-85. The court premised its decision against the treatment on the
possible risks involved in blood transfusions which would at most prolong Henry's
life, the serious doubt as to the usefulness of the proposed medical procedures WItlell
were new and experimental, and the inaccuracy of medical advice in the past WItlell
had incorrectly indicated a dire need for such transfusions. Id. Cf. Kaimowitz v.
Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73·19434·AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973),
noted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063. See notes 105·54 supra and accompanying text.
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blindly adhering to medical testimony in all circumstances, courts should
afford some probative value to parents' views, even when those ideas are
in conflict with the physician's opinion. The numerous medical judgments
necessitated by the court's test, however, highlight once again the diffi-
culties encountered in resolving "medico-legal" questions in patients'
rights litigation.334
Though we lament the fact that Ricky Green will not receive spinal
surgery, the court's conclusion to allow a mentally alert sixteen }'ear-old
to have significant input in making his own health care decision seems
completely defensible.33l; However, to the extent that the decision turns
on Ms. Greens' first amendment rights, rather than Ricky's right to
control his own body, the case's precedential value for minor's health
rights is diminished. The Sampson decision, in contrast, permitting needed
corrective surgery, achieves an admirable result for Kevin but unfortu-
nately invokes the fear of a return to judicial paternalism reminiscent of
the pre-Gault era.336 This implication, however, may be mitigated by the
facts of Kevin's case. Although the court never explicitly analyzed Kevin
Sampson's competence to understand the nature of tlle procedure and to
make an informed choice, his undeniable inability to do either probably
played a determinative part in the court's decision. In Henry Green, the
issue of the patient's own informed consent never arose because tlle child
involved was too young to participate in the decision-making; the court
instead gracefully avoided the subjective determination of Henry's best
interests and looked instead to the "reasonableness" of his mother's ob-
jections. Henry Green utilized a balancing test in which tlle court con-
sidered many pertinent factors similar to those in tlle abortion decision
Matter of P.J.331
CONCLUSION
This overview of many of the recent cases involving patients' rights
demonstrates that definitive conclusions are difficult at best. The primary
impression, by way of a partial disclaimer, must be that there is an enor-
mous tension among the many weighty interests presented in this area of
334. See Kaimowitz, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973). See
also cases such as CanterbUry v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which confronts
some of the difficulties encountered in trying to evaluate medical discretion. Finally,
consider cases in which courts have issued, upon medical advice, emergency orders
which have subsequently proved unnecessary. See, e.g., Santos v. Goldstein, 16 App.
Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.s.2d 450, motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 672,
185 N.E.2d 904 (1962), 233 N.Y.s.2d 465 (1962); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Ope 2d 86, 185
N.E.2d 128, 90 Ohio 1.. Abs. 21 (C.P. 1962).
335. See final opinion of case after remand In re Green, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d
279 (1973). See text accompanying note 311 supra and notc 312 supra.
336. In re Gault, 387 U.s. I (1967).
337. 12 Cr. L. Rptr. 2549 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1973). See notes 247-49 supra
and accompanying text.
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law: the intimate, personal rights of the patient, the schooled and con·
cerned opinions of the physicians, the well-intentioned parental desire
for their children's well-being, and the solicitude of the state for the
health and welfare of its population. The decisions, practically uniform
in their lack of articulate standards, reflect the enormity of the burden
as well as the complexity of the determinations and, unfortunately, leave
subsequent courts and commentators to inference. Some guidelines have,
however, tentatively emerged. Judicial and legislative behavior have
evidenced a trend toward the recognition of minors' capacity to consent
to their own health care. This development is reflected not only in liberal-
ized medical consent statutes but also in judicial solicitation of minors'
views about the proposed treatment. As the questions become more com-
plex, courts have begun to move away from deciding what is in the
child's best interest and toward determining who shall make the decisions
affecting a minor's life. In general, where the patient is mature and com-
petent enough to understand the nature of the issues involved, the courts
have increasingly deferred to his or her own wishes.
Nevertheless, looking to the future, one must make an ardent plea
for more clearly explicated rationales in decisions involving patients'
rights. In speculating, one might note that the title of a book written by
a women's collective may prove to be an apt forecast of judicial determina-
tions to come---Our Bodies, Ourselves.338
338. Boston Women's Health Book Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves (1973).
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